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ECONOMIC COMPETITION AND THE SUPREME COURT:
DECISIONS IN THE 1977 TERM
Jeff Miles*
John Russell**
Through the years, the Supreme Court has emphasized numerous
times that "[t]he heart of our national economic policy long has
been faith in the value of competition."' Indeed, this principle was
reiterated last Term.2 Crucial to economic competition are the anti-
trust laws, especially the Sherman Act.'
Increasingly, however, proponents of competition are realizing
that tools other than the antitrust laws can be used to promote a
more competitive economy. The Antitrust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice, for example, regularly testifies before various con-
gressional committees and regulatory agencies on matters affecting
competition, whether or not the antitrust laws are directly impli-
* B.S., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1968; M.A., 1971; J.D., Wash-
ington & Lee University, 1973. Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Unit, Commonwealth
of Virginia.
** B.A., Washington & Lee University, 1974; J.D., University of Richmond, 1978. Assist-
ant Attorney General, Antitrust Unit, Commonwealth of Virginia.
The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the
views of the Virginia Office of Attorney General.
1. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951); see also United States v. Topco
Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4
(1956).
2. In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 98 S.Ct. 1123, 1129 (1978), dis-
cussed in Part IV infra, Mr. Justice Brennan noted that in passing the Sherman Act,
"Congress . . . sought to establish a regime of competition as the fundamental principle
governing commerce in this country."
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
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cated.1 Numerous industry regulatory schemes provide express5 or
implied' exemptions from antitrust challenge in certain circumstan-
ces. Administrative and judicial interpretation of these regulatory
schemes delineates how broad or narrow the exemption is.
Finally, there are legal precepts which, while facially neutral, can
be invoked to foster competition where the antitrust laws are not a
viable weapon. Perhaps the clearest case is in the area of commer-
cial speech. In the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy case,7 Vir-
ginia's statutory proscription of drug price advertising was declared
unconstitutional under the first amendment. Although the identical
practice would violate the Sherman Act if implemented by agree-
ment of private pharmacists, antitrust challenge of the statute
would have failed because of the state action exemption.8
Thus, while antitrust cases are paramount in determining the
effect which the Supreme Court exerts on competition, cases involv-
ing constitutional law and statutes other than the antitrust laws
must also be examined. However, a word of caution is in order.
Because non-antitrust statutes and constitutional provisions often
promote objectives other than competition, and different frame-
works of analysis are used in interpreting these provisions, it is
dangerous to conclude from such cases that the Court is either re-
ceptive or hostile to a competitive philosophy. Often, the most that
can be said is that a decision will have a procompetitive or anticom-
petitive effect.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE 1977 TERM
Twelve cases decided last Term will generate sufficient competi-
tive effects to merit discussion. Seven were antitrust cases; one was
primarily a commerce clause case, although the Robinson-Patman
4. See generally Kauper, Competition Policy and the Institutions of Antitrust, 23 S.D. L.
REv. 1 (1978).
5. See, e.g., 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1970) (approval of certain shipping industry agreements by
the Federal Maritime Commission provides an antitrust exemption).
6. See, e.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 695 (1975)
(securities industry).
7. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
8. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977), which held that the Bar's prohibi-
tion of advertising was protected from antitrust challenge by the state action exemption but
was an unconstitutional suppression of speech.
[Vol. 13:1
ECONOMIC COMPETITION AND THE SUPREME COURT
Act appeared in a supremacy clause context; two implicated the
first amendment; one arose under the Communications Act of 1934;
and one settled an important issue affecting international competi-
tion.
Of the seven antitrust cases, three involved exemptions and evi-
denced the current Court's hostility toward exclusions from anti-
trust coverage. In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,9
the fourth state action exemption case decided by the Court in its
last four Terms, the Court held, in a confusing five to four decision,
that the actions of municipalities are not necessarily exempt from
antitrust challenge. In National Broiler Marketing Association v.
United States, 10 it held that where any member of an agricultural
cooperative is not a "farmer," the coop loses its Capper-Volstead
Act" exemption. Finally, the Court held in St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co. v. Barry12 that the meaning of "boycott," as used in
the McCarran-Ferguson Act,13 is sufficiently broad to encompass a
boycott by insurance companies of their policyholders and that such
conduct is not exempt from antitrust challenge.
Two antitrust cases dealt with procedure. In Pfizer, Inc. v. Gov-
ernment of India, 11 the Court interpreted "person" as used in section
4 of the Clayton Act15 to include foreign countries, thus giving them
standing to sue for treble damages. And in Greyhound Corp. v. Mt.
Hood Stages, Inc.,1" it said that section 5(i) of the Clayton Act,17
which tolls the statute of limitations for one year after an enforce-
ment action by the United States, is not tolled by government inter-
vention in an Interstate Commerce Commission proceeding.
Two antitrust cases decided last Term involved interpretation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act," and each cut to the heart of funda-
mental antitrust analysis. In National Society of Professional Engi-
9. 98 S.Ct. 1123 (1978) (discussed in Part IV infra).
10. 98 S.Ct. 2122 (1978) (discussed in Part VI infra).
11. Cooperative Marketing Association Act, 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1976).
12. 98 S.Ct. 2923 (1978) (discussed in Part V infra).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1970).
14. 434 U.S. 308 (1978) (discussed in Part VI infra).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
16. 98 S.Ct. 2370 (1978) (discussed in Part VI infra).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 16(i) (1976).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
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neers v. United States,"9 the Court held that an agreement not to
submit competitive bids restrains trade on its face and is therefore
a per se violation of the Sherman Act. The Court explained that
factors other than a restraint's competitive impact are immaterial
in determining its legality.20 The second case, United States v.
United States Gypsum Co.,21 established what degree of intent must
be shown for conviction in a criminal antitrust case and, in addition,
held that verifying prices with competitors to sustain the "meeting
competition" defense of the Robinson-Patman Act 22 does not pre-
clude a price-fixing conviction.
Five cases interpreting provisions other than the antitrust laws
have significant competitive ramifications. Without doubt, Exxon
Corp. v. Maryland2 was the most important. It upheld, against
substantive due process and commerce clause challenges, a Mary-
land statute prohibiting oil producers from operating their own re-
tail outlets in the state. Of particular interest to professionals are
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association'A and In re Primus, which
dealt with the validity, under the first amendment, of state imposed
prohibitions of in-person solicitation by attorneys. In Zenith Radio
Corp. v. United States,2 1 the Court held that Japan's failure to tax
certain products exported rather than sold in Japan did not require
the United States to levy a duty against such goods under the Tariff
Act of 19302 upon importation here. Finally, in FCC v. National
Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 2 the Court upheld a regula-
tion of the Federal Communications Commission which prohibits
future common ownership of newspaper and broadcasting combina-
tions serving the same market and requires that some existing com-
binations divest one of the media.29
19. 98 S.Ct. 1355 (1978) (discussed in Part I infra).
20. Id. at 1363.
21. 98 S.Ct. 2864 (1978) (discussed in Part II infra).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1970); see note 30 infra.
23. 98 S.Ct. 2207 (1978) (discussed in Part VII infra).
24. 98 S.Ct. 1912 (1978) (discussed in Part VII infra).
25. 98 S.Ct. 1893 (1978) (discussed in Part VII infra).
26. 98 S.Ct. 2441 (1978) (discussed in Part VII infra).
27. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (Supp. V, 1975).
28. 98 S.Ct. 2096 (1978) (discussed in Part VII infra).
29. Other cases last Term implicate competitive considerations to some extent. See, e.g.,
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 98 S.Ct. 1407 (1978) (declaring a state's prohibition of certain
advertising by corporations unconstitutional); FMC v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 98 S.Ct. 927
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These cases highlight the myriad of contexts in which decisions
affecting the strong national policy favoring competition can arise.
Each deserves examination not only to grasp the legal principles
espoused, but also to ascertain generally how well the paradigm of
economic competition has fared.
II. WHAT INTENT MUST BE SHOWN FOR A CRIMINAL ANTITRUST
CONVICTION?
United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,"0 a criminal case
under section 1 of the Sherman Act, involved the legality of an
interseller price verification program. Manufacturers of gypsum
board called one another to verify that a certain price had been
offered to a specific customer. While the government claimed that
the program was a price fixing agreement, the defendants argued
that the verification was necessary to sustain the "meeting competi-
tion" defense of the Robinson-Patman Act.31
The legality of price and other data information exchange pro-
grams has caused the Court difficulty since at least 1921, and the
cases are not totally reconcilable.2 One reason for this diversity of
(1978) (requiring certain shipping industry collective bargaining agreements to be approved
by the FMC); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 98 S.Ct. 2482 (1978) (invalidating, under the privileges and
immunities clause, a state statute requiring employment preference for the state's citizens
on certain jobs); In re Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 98 S.Ct. 2053 (1978) (upholding
power of ICC to summarily fix pipeline tariffs in certain situations); NLRB v. Iron Workers
Local No. 103, 434 U.S. 1365 (1978) (declaring certain picketing to enforce a pre-hire agree-
ment an unfair labor practice); Parker v. Flook, 98 S.Ct. 2522 (1978) (invention not patenta-
ble where only novel feature was mathematical formula); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v.
Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 447 (1978) (striking, on commerce clause grounds, a state statute barring
trucks longer than fifty-five feet, where evidence was only speculative that highway safety
would be enhanced).
30. 98 S.Ct. 2864 (1978).
31. Under § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970), it is "unlawful
for any person . . . to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of
like grade and quality. . . where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. . .
Section 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1970), allows the defendant to discriminate in price where
"his lower price . . . was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competi-
tor. . ..
The defendants argued that it was necessary for them to verify prices offered by competitors
with competitors because buyers were not a reliable source of information. Buyers benefitted
from fabricating low offers and then playing one seller against another.
32. Compare United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969) (data
dissemination among competitors illegal) with United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank,
422 U.S. 86 (1975) (data dissemination among competitors legal).
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results is that the effect of the program on price depends upon the
type of information exchanged, the structure of the industry and
characteristics of the product sold. 33
Even where an effect on prices was shown, courts have wrestled
with situations which arguably might negate a finding that the
Sherman Act was violated. In Cement Manufacturers Protective
Association v. United States, 34 for example, the Court upheld an
information exchange program which aided manufacturers in pro-
tecting themselves from the fraudulent conduct of their customers,
notwithstanding that the program tended to stabilize prices. The
Court in United States v. Container Corp. of America3 . later referred
to this as a "controlling circumstance. '3 In Wall Products Co. v.
National Gypsum Co.,"7 a private action involving price verification,
the district court found a "controlling circumstance," where "the
purpose of the verification communications of the wallboard produ-
cers was to permit compliance with the Robinson-Patman Act, '38 or
to preclude fraud perpetrated against the defendant sellers by their
customers,39 notwithstanding that prices were stabilized.
Indeed, as the government recognized in its brief in Gypsum, "[e]xchanges of information
between competitors occupy a position in the grey areas of antitrust law." Brief for the United
States at 73, United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 98 S.Ct. 2864 (1978).
33. Conventional wisdom is that where the industry is composed of a large number of
sellers, the product is differentiated and the information exchanged does not pertain to
specific customers or current transactions, little danger of price stabilization arises; to the
contrary, the program is beneficial because efficiency is increased. On the other hand, where
the industry is concentrated, the product homogeneous, and current price information re-
specting specific customers is exchanged, price rigidity can be expected. See generally Note,
Antitrust Liability for An Exchange of Price Information - What Happened to Container
Corporation?, 63 VA. L. Rav. 639 (1977). In United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393
U.S. 333 (1969), where price stabilization did result, a civil violation of the Sherman Act was
found. Because, however, effect must be shown, the per se standard is inapplicable.
34. 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
35. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
36. Id. at 335. In Cement, the Court emphasized that there was no agreement actually to
employ the information obtained. A fair reading of the case is that an agreement to exchange
information, without more, is not violative of the Sherman Act, notwithstanding that an
adverse economic effect flows indirectly therefrom. Thus, Cement may have held not that
an agreement otherwise violative of the Sherman Act was protected by a controlling circum-
stance, but rather that there was no agreement for Sherman Act purposes. Later cases,
especially Container, make clear that the agreement to exchange information itself is a
sufficient agreement to meet the conspiracy requirement of section 1.
37. 326 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
38. Id. at 314 (emphasis added).
39. The crux of the court's holding was as follows:
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Price verification cases such as Container and especially those
with Robinson-Patman meeting competition defense aspects, when
read together, emphasize the important roles which purpose and
effect have played in determining an exchange program's validity
under section 1. However, in no case in which the meeting competi-
tion defense was raised as an affirmative defense to a price fixing
charge did the particular court pay more than lip service to accom-
modating the policies underlying section 1 of the Sherman Act and
section 2(b).4o Policies underlying the Robinson-Patman Act were
given precedence over the Sherman Act, and the purpose of the
program, i.e., to sustain the section 2(b) defense, was considered
more important than the program's effect on prices. This is ironic
because the Supreme Court has implied that the Robinson-Patman
Act is a less important antitrust statute than the Sherman Act.41
Many authorities are extremely critical of the Robinson-Patman
Act4" and commentators agree that effect is as important, if not
[In Cement Manufacturers the Supreme Court held lawful. . . an exchange be-
tween sellers of price information relating to specific customers, even under circum-
stances amounting to an agreement, where the purpose of the exchange was to safe-
guard against fraud and deception, and even though prices might be affected thereby.
Here, the "controlling circumstance" of Cement Manufacturers is present in abund-
ance and relates not only the defendants' efforts to meet the requirements of the
Robinson-Patman Act, but also to their efforts to avoid the consequences of fraudulent
misrepresentations of buyers. The record is replete with evidence that the purpose of
the verification communications . . . was to permit compliance with the Robinson-
Patman Act. The evidence also discloses that the verification communications served
to protect defendants against the fraudulent practices of buyers. There is ample evi-
dence in the record that the buyers attempted to obtain lower wallboard prices from
producers by misrepresenting the lower prices which they claimed to have been offered
by competitors.
No court is required by the Sherman Act to foster "competition" procured by fraud
and misrepresentation, and the Sherman Act does not prohibit a defendant from
protecting itself therefrom. That is "the controlling circumstance" of Cement Manu-
facturers. Container recognizes and approves that controlling circumstance.
Id. at 314-15 (emphasis in original). The rationale of Wall Products appears to have been
accepted in Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 923
(1973); and Webster v. Sinclair Refining Co., 338 F. Supp. 248 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
40. See, e.g., Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943
(1973); Bellistarr v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 928 (1972);
Wall Products Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 326 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Webster v.
Sinclair Refining Co., 338 F. Supp. 248 (S.D. Ala. 1971).
41. See Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 74 (1953).
42. Professor Bork, in evaluating the Robinson-Patman Act, minces no words:
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:1
more important, than purpose in determining whether a practice
violates the antitrust laws.43
While previous interseller verification cases were civil actions,
Gypsum resulted from indictments. Evidence showed that the gyp-
sum board industry was concentrated, with the eight largest firms
having ninety-four percent of the market; that gypsum board is
homogeneous, meaning that competition between firms was based
on price; and that industry demand was inelastic, meaning that
changes in price had little effect on total demand. While the defen-
dants admitted that some price verification occurred, they claimed
its purpose only was to sustain the meeting competition defense.
Based on the instructions given them,44 which are crucial to an
understanding of the Supreme Court's subsequent decision, the jury
convicted the defendants.
The attempt to counter the supposed threat to competition posed by price discrimi-
nation constitutes what is surely antitrust's least glorious hour. The instrument fash-
ioned for the task was the Robinson-Patman Act, the misshapen progeny of intolerable
draftsmanship coupled to wholly mistaken economic theory. . . . Although it does not
prevent much price discrimination, at least it has stifled a great deal of competition.
R. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox: A Pouby AT WAR wiTH ITsELF 382 (1978).
43. See, e.g., L. SuuivAN, ANTRUST 194 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SuLLIvAN].
44. The salient portions of the instructions were as follows:
First, you must determine whether there was an agreement, either implied or ex-
press, to engage in the practice of price checking or verification.
Secondly, you must determine whether the purpose for the exchange of competitive
information. ., was to insure a good faith meeting of competition as a defense to the
Robinson-Patmian Act.
If you decide . . .this was merely done in a good faith effort to comply with the
Robinson-Patman Act, then you could not consider verification, standing alone, as
establishing an agreement to fix, raise, maintain, and stabilize prices as charged.
However, if you decide that the effect of these exchanges was to raise, fix, maintain,
and stabilize the price of gypsum wallboard, then you may consider these [exichanges
as evidence of the mutual agreement or understanding alleged in the indictment. . . .
. ..If the effect of such exchanges was to raise, fix, maintain or stabilize prices,
then an agreement to engage in such an exchange is a violation of the Sherman Act,
regardless of the specific purpose that the parties to the agreement had in their minds.
That is because the Sherman Act does not require proof of a specific purpose to restrain
trade in order to establish the offense.
The law presumes that a person intends the necessary and natural consequences of
his acts. Therefore, if the effect of the exchanges of pricing information was to raise,
fix, maintain, and stabilize prices, then the parties to them are presumed, as a matter
of law, to have intended that result.
Brief for United States at 55-56, 98 S.Ct. 2864 (1978).
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On appeal, the defendants argued that they were required to
investigate and verify allegedly lower prices offered customers by
competitors before the meeting competition defense could be sus-
tained. This, they argued, meant verifying prices with competitors,
where necessary,45 and required that their purpose in exchanging
price information be considered before legality under section 1 could
be determined.
The Third Circuit,46 relying on Cement, held that where there was
a "controlling circumstance," an information exchange program
could be upheld, notwithstanding a presumed or proven effect on
price. On the other hand, while recognizing that cases such as Wall
Products establish that a purpose to sustain the 2(b) defense is a
controlling circumstance, it feared that such "quite broad" inter-
pretations might "eviscerate the Sherman Act for the benefit of
Robinson-Patman."47 It therefore sought to reach an accommoda-
tion by not requiring as great a burden of investigation and verifica-
tion as the defendants had argued was necessary. A defendant
would sustain the 2(b) defense if it had taken every other reasonable
step to corroborate the offer short of verification with a competitor,
and it had no independent reason to doubt the purchaser's reliabil-
ity." Only where the required investigation of reliability or previous
45. The defendants relied primarily on FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945),
and Viviano Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 411 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1969). In Staley, the seller justified
its discriminatory prices on oral reports from salesmen and potential purchasers. Although it
was stipulated that the seller believed such reports to be true, the section 2(b) defense was
not sustained because the seller did not "investigate or verify" either the reports or the
"character and reliability" of the informants. 324 U.S. at 758. Viviano involved three instan-
ces of price discrimination, and the meeting competition defense was rejected in each. In the
first, the seller argued that he had sufficient experience in the industry to know what his
competitors were offering and that he knew whose offers he was meeting. In the second, he
relied on the oral representation of the purchaser. And in the third, he relied on information
from a long-time salesman of his company. In each case, the court found a failure to investi-
gate, verify or corroborate the information.
On the basis of these cases, the defendants in Gypsum argued that they must either (1)
verify offers with competitors; (2) lower their price and risk violation; or (3) for go the price
reduction and risk losing the sale. 550 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977), affl'd, 98 S.Ct. 2864 (1978).
46. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115, (3d Cir. 1977), aff'd 98 S.Ct.
2864 (1978).
47. Id. at 125.
48. The court said, "If Robinson-Patman is interpreted to permit a seller lacking other
corroboration to cut his price without taking the ultimate corroborative step of verifying the
purchaser's report with his competitor, then the Sherman Act and Container retain more
vigor." Id. at 125-26.
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experience revealed that the buyer could not be trusted could the
seller verify with competitors. Accordingly, the defendants were en-
titled to an instruction which allowed the jury to consider these
variables, and the case was reversed.49
The Third Circuit's approach, similar to that taken in previous
civil cases, was to determine whether a purpose to sustain the sec-
tion 2(b) defense was a sufficient affirmative defense to a price-
fixing charge. Although the Supreme Court continued this focus on
purpose, it structured its analysis quite differently from the court
below. Rather than equating purpose with affirmative defense, the
Court first focused on whether an anticompetitive purpose was an
element which must be proved by the government in a criminal
case. In other words, what intent, if any, must the government show
in a criminal antitrust case?" Only then did it consider whether a
49. With respect to proper instructions, the Court held that
appellants were entitled to an instruction that their verification practice would not
violate the Sherman Act if the jury found: (1) the appellants engaged in the practice
solely to comply with the strictures of Robinson-Patman; (2) they had first resorted to
all other reasonable means of corroboration, without success; (3) they had good, inde-
pendent reason to doubt the buyers' truthfulness; and (4) their communication with
competitors was strictly limited to the one price and one buyer at issue. Trial court
charged instead that if the jury found that verification had an effect on prices, they
had to find guilt under the Sherman Act.
Id. at 126-27.
50. In their briefs, the parties did not focus specifically on what degree of intent, if any,
must be proved by the government. The government argued, as it had below, that "once an
effect on prices has been demonstrated, no motive, however benign, is sufficient to excuse
the practice." Brief for the United States at 76, United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
98 S.Ct. 2864 (1978). Although purpose or intent was discussed by defendants, it was not
emphasized. See Respondent's Joint Brief at 44-46, 98 S.Ct. 2864 (1978).
Thus, one wonders why the Court decided to expound on the intent necessary to sustain a
criminal conviction, especially when it could have decided the case by approving or disap-
proving the meeting competition theory as an affirmative defense. Perhaps, the reason flows
from several lower court decisions, subsequent to the 1974 amendments to the Sherman Act
raising the violation from a misdemeanor to a felony, where it was argued that specific intent
must be shown for criminal conviction.
Previous cases had held that only "presumed intent" had to be shown. For example, in
United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 543 (1913), the Court said:
And that there is no allegation of a specific intent to restrain such trade or commerce
does not make against this conclusion, for, as is shown by prior decisions of this court,
the conspirators must be held to have intended the necessary and direct consequences
of their acts and cannot be heard to say the contrary. In other words, by purposely
engaging in a conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces the result which the
statute is designed to prevent, they are, in legal contemplation, chargeable with in-
tending that result.
ECONOMIC COMPETITION AND THE SUPREME COURT
purpose to sustain the section 2(b) defense was sufficient to pre-
clude conviction.
The Court, in an opinion written by the Chief Justice, first deter-
mined, six to two, that "an effect on prices, without more, will not
support a criminal conviction under the Sherman Act. 5 1 Hence it
was unwilling to accept the idea of strict criminal liability.2
That some degree of intent is a necessary element was derived
from three considerations. First, and perhaps most importantly,
although certain crimes require no intent, these are the exception
rather than the rule. Relying primarily on Morisette v. United
States,.3 the Court adopted the view that a crime should embody
"[a] relation between some mental element and'punishment for a
harmful act. . .. ""
Second, that intent is not specifically mentioned in the Sherman
Act was not dispositive. The question is one of legislative intent, and
the legislature "will be presumed to have legislated against the
background of our traditional legal concepts which render intent a
That this standard continued through the years is shown by the instructions in Gypsum, see
note 42 supra, as well as instructions given in other criminal antitrust cases. See generally
AmERicAN BAR ASsocATIoN, JuRY INSTRUCTIONs iN CRmluNA ANTrITRUST CAsES: 1964-1976 at
163-68 (1978).
Subsequent to 1974, however, several cases dealt with what degree of intent had to be
shown for conviction. That specific intent is necessary was rejected in United States v.
Champion Int'l Corp., 557 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Jack Foley Realty, Inc.,
[1977-2] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 61,678 (D.Md. 1977); and United States v. Noll Mfg.
Co., [1977-2] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 61,712 (N.D. Cal. 1977); but was accepted in United
States v. Nu-Phonics, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 1006, 1013 (E.D. Mich. 1977), where the court said
that "[iut must be shown that the defendants joined together for the purpose of fixing
prices." (Emphasis in original.)
Although none of these cases were cited by the Court and although Gypsum was a misde-
meanor case, it appears reasonable to assume thatthe Court wished to settle the question.
51. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 98 S.Ct. 2864, 2872 (1978).
52. The Court emphasized, however, that it was leaving "unchanged the general rule" that
either unlawful purpose or anticompetitive effect is sufficient to establish civil liability. Id.
at 2873 n.13.
53. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
54. Gypsum, 98 S.Ct. at 2873 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. at 250-51).
Morissette discussed when intent properly is an element of a criminal offense and when not.
For example, often intent need not be proved in "public welfare offenses," 342 U.S. at 255,
i.e., public health, safety and welfare matters involving, for example, food, drink, drugs or
even securities. Such offenses "are not iI the nature of positive aggressions or invasions...
but are in the nature of neglect .. " Id. In addition, crimes not requiring intent often are
not infamous crimes but rather minor offenses with petty penalties, conviction of which "does
no grave damage to an offender's reputation." Id. at 256.
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critical factor."' 5 Finally, the broadness of the Sherman Act and
lack of clear and definitive rules of conduct, militated against a
strict liability standard. This lack of clarity might induce business-
men to eschew borderline, but procompetitive, conduct.
Having determined that some level of intent must be proved, the
Court, while recognizing "'the variety, disparity and confusion' of
judicial definitions of the 'requisite but elusive mental element' of
criminal offenses,"5 turned its attention to the degree of intent
which must be proved.
The Court chose as its guide the American Law Institute's Model
Penal Code, which defines four levels of intent, viz., purpose, knowl-
edge, recklessness 'and negligence. 57 Finding that concepts of reck-
lessness and negligence were inapposite to business decisions, it
focused on choosing between purpose, i.e., "the 'conscious object' of
producing [anticompetitive] effects," or knowledge, i.e., "that the
proscribed effects would most likely follow."58 Because knowledge
55. 98 S.Ct. at 2873.
56. Id. at 2877 (quoting United States v. Morissette, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952)).
57. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (Prop. Official Draft 1962), in pertinent part, provides as
follows:
Section 2.02. General Requirements of Culpability.
(1) Minimum Requirements of Culpability. Except as provided in Section
2.05, a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly,
recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material
element of the offense.
(2) Kinds of Culpability Defined.
(a) Purposely.
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense
when;
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof,
it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause
such a result; and
(b) Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an of-
fense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such
circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it
is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
While the Court in Gypsum referred to the comments to an earlier draft, MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02 (Tent. Draft No. 4 1955), there is no indication that it relied on the earlier version of
the penal code rather than the version finally adopted by the American Law Institute.
58. 98 S.Ct. at 2877.
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appeared to be the prevalent standard in criminal cases and proof
of such would evidence some consciousness of wrongdoing, the Court
held that "action undertaken with knowledge of its probable conse-
quences and having the requisite anticompetitive effects can be a
sufficient predicate for a finding of criminal liability under the anti-
trust laws." 9 The Court was careful to note that if purpose were
shown, effects need not be.60
The Court thus held that the instruction below was erroneous
because it established a conclusive presumption of intent from a
finding that the verification program affected prices. Although ef-
fect is a factor which the jury properly could consider in determining
whether the defendant knew that such was the probable conse-
quence of its act, whether it did know is a question which could not
be taken from the jury."' Accordingly, the Third Circuit's result was
affirmed.12
59. Id. Note that this standard places a slightly lower burden on the prosecution than does
the Model Penal Code which requires awareness "that it is practically certain" that the
proscribed result will follow. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b)(ii), supra note 55.
60. 98 S.Ct. at 2877 n.21. This emphasizes the oft-repeated maxim that a conspiracy in
restraint of trade need not be successful to be illegal.
61. The lower court made a common error which is explained cogently by Professor Per-
kins:
It is frequently stated, .... that "everyone is presumed to intend the natural and
probable consequences of his act." The word "presumed" is the key to such a phrase
... A true presumption is a rule of evidence which calls for a certain result...
unless the party adversely affected by the presumption comes forward with evidence
to overcome it. This is sometimes referred to as a "prima-facie presumption" to distin-
guish it from the so called "conclusive presumption" which is a legal device in the form
of a postulate used for the determination of a particular case whether it corresponds
with the actual facts or not. A third use is the so-called "presumption of fact" meaning
"mere inferences of fact not affecting the accused with a duty to produce evidence."
Presumed intent has been used in all three of these senses.
An intent which is conclusively presumed is one which does not exist in fact but only
by legal fiction. In other words it is a "constructive intent." . . . And despite some
indications to the contrary it seems fairly well established that the "presumed to
intend" formula is not a true presumption, but (when used otherwise than "conclusive
presumption") means merely an inference of fact. . . . It may be useful in instructing
juries to speak in terms of "presumed to intend," if care is taken to make clear exactly
what is meant in the particular case. ...
R. PriWNS, Ciu1mNAL LAW 747-48 (1969) (footnotes omitted). See also W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr,
CmMINAL LAw 202-03 (1972).
62. Mr. Justice Rehnquist dissented. Mr. Justice Stevens, if he "were fashioning a new test
of criminal liability. . . would require proof of a specific purpose to violate the law." 98 S.Ct.
at 2892 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He appeared to argue,
however, that given the language of section 1, only effect is necessary to prove intent. Interest-
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The Supreme Court then considered whether a purpose to comply
with the meeting competition defense of the Robinson-Patman Act
would constitute a "controlling circumstance" and exempt conduct
otherwise violative of section 1.13 Because six justices were able to
reconcile the Sherman and Robinson-Patman Acts by holding that
interseller verification was not required under the latter, they found
it unnecessary to ascertain "the existence and proper scope of the
so-called controlling circumstance exception."64
The Court noted that no court, in a meeting competition case,
had ever specifically required interseller verification to sustain the
section 2(b) defense and emphasized that a good faith belief with
respect to a competitor's offer, rather than absolute certainty, is all
that is required." It believed that in most circumstances, the stan-
dard could be met by proving that other customers had reported
similar offers; that the buyer had threatened to purchase from oth-
ers; and by obtaining documentary evidence which showed the com-
petitor's offer.6 In perhaps the most troublesome portion of the
opinion, however, the Court implied that situations may arise where
the defense simply is unavailable because no corroboration short of
interseller verification was possible. 7 Justice Powell parted com-
pany with the Court on this point.68
The Court's rejection of the defense appeared to rest upon two
ingly, he noted that "lain argument can be made that an agreement among the major
producers in the market to exchange current price information should be considered illegal
on its face." Id. at 2893 n.6.
63. It was necessary for the Court to consider this issue because, if the defense were
accepted, it would negate a successful prosecution irrespective of the defendant's intent.
64. 98 S.Ct. at 2880.
65. Id. at 2880-81.
66. Id. at 2882.
67. This situation would arise where the seller had "substantial reasons" not to believe the
reports he had received and was unable to corroborate through "generally accepted ways."
Id. at 2883. The Court, however, specifically refused to decide definitely that the defense
would not be available in such a situation.
68. Mr. Justice Powell realized that such an ambiguous result, i.e., holding that the de-
fense might be unavailable, would induce the seller to forgo a price cut because of a fear of
violating the Robinson-Patman Act, and that this would undercut the competitive polices
underlying the Sherman Act. He argued that a seller who uses all reasonable means short of
competitor discussions has carried his burden and sustains the meeting-competition defense.
However, he did not think the Court had taken a "firm position" on the question of whether
factual situations could arise where the defense was not available. 98 S.Ct. at 2890 n.2
(Powell, J., concurring in part).
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premises. First, the efficacy of the Sherman Act would be decreased
by holding otherwise. The Court recognized that "[e]specially in
oligopolistic industries . . . the exchange of price information
among competitors carries with it the added potential for the devel-
opment of concerted price-fixing arrangements which lie at the core
of the Sherman Act's prohibitions."6 This, and the Court's subse-
quent reference to Automatic Canteen,70 in which it had noted the
Sherman Act's lodestar position among the antitrust laws, suggest
that the Sherman Act is at the apex of the "Magna Carta of free
enterprise."7
Second, the Court, relying on basic tenets of price theory, argued
that in an oligopolistic industry, price verification programs do little
good because one competitor will misrepresent his price in discus-
sions with another. Only if a price cut is kept secret does the offeror
gain; otherwise the cut will be met. In addition, if all competitors
know that their low offer will be discovered, the same theory posits
that no seller will bother to deviate from the "going price." Again,
if one lowers its price and others find out, they will match it, and
thus, there is no inducement for any competitor to lower its price.
Because, on the one hand, economics taught that a verification
program would not serve its intended purposes, and on the other,
could lead to entrenched price stabilization, the Court held that a
purpose to sustain the meeting competition defense was not suffi-
cient to negate a section 1 violation.72
From a practical standpoint, the Court's holding on the
Robinson-Patman issue places sellers in that quagmire alluded to
by the defendants, the Third Circuit,73 and Mr. Justice Powell. 7 In
some situations, sellers are faced with the choice of not meeting the
lower offer of a competitor and losing a sale or risking a treble-
damage action. Perhaps the courts will be sensitive to this dilemma
and agree with Mr. Justice Powell that a seller is safe if he does all
69. 98 S.Ct. at 2884.
70. Automatic Canteen v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
71. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
72. 98 S.Ct. at 2883. Gypsum also presented issues concerning: (1) the correctness of
instructions involving participation in and withdrawal from the conspiracy, and (2) whether
the judge coerced a verdict. These are not discussed here.
73. See note 43 supra.
74. See note 64 supra.
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that can reasonably be expected of him, short of verification with
competitors.
The more interesting portion of the opinion is that dealing with
intent. Although it is doubtful that the decision will have any sub-
stantial effect on either civil or criminal enforcement,75 it does raise
several questions.
First, what evidence of intent must the government offer in a per
se case, where both purpose and effect traditionally have been con-
clusively presumed? Mr. Justice Stevens appeared to recognize this
question in his opinion,76 but neither he nor the majority explored
it. Gypsum, however, should not cause any change. The Court rec-
ognized the continuing propriety of per se analyses in both the 1976
Term77 and the 1977 Term,7 albeit in a civil context. In addition,
in United States v. Nu-Phonics, Inc.,7 a recent criminal case which
held that the government must prove specific intent or that the
purpose of the agreement was to fix prices where "indirect price-
fixing" 0 was charged, the Court recognized that evidence of purpose
is not necessary in per se cases.5' Perhaps the real battleground is
whether the per se rule is applicable to the particular conduct in
75. In the civil context, intent remains immaterial except to the extent that a conspiracy
to fix prices is unsuccessful or intent sheds some light on a practice's competitive effect. See
generally Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("knowledge of
intent may help the court . . . to predict consequences"). With respect to criminal cases, it
appears that standards used by the Antitrust Division in determining whether to indict
encompass probable knowledge of consequences. See generally Baker, To Indict or Not to
Indict: Prosecutorial Discretion in Sherman Act Enforcement, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 405, 411-
12, 414 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Prosecutorial Discretion]. With respect to price informa-
tion exchanges, Mr. Justice Stevens noted that "if the practice of exchanging current price
information is sufficiently prevalent to affect the market price, then there is an extremely
high probability that the sales representatives of these companies had actual knowledge of
that fact." 98 S.Ct. at 2893 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76. 98 S.Ct. at 2892 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
78. See National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 98 S.Ct. 1355 (1978) (discussed in
part III infra).
79. 433 F.Supp. 1006 (E.D. Mich. 1977). See note 48 supra.
80. Referred to as "indirect price fixing" were agreements not to quote prices over the
telephone and not to advertise prices.
81. With respect to an agreement to charge $180 over cost for all state business, the court
said, "The anticompetitive purpose of an express or tacit agreement to fix prices - i.e., a
direct price-fixing conspiracy - is apparent from the very nature of the agreement, and no
other proof of purpose is'required." 433 F.Supp. at 1012.
See also United States v. Continental Group, Inc., No. 76-514 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 1978), a
post-Gypsum case holding that Gypsum did not affect the per se rule.
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question. At worst from a prosecutor's viewpoint, however, the de-
fendant's evidence of intent (but not of justification) will be admit-
ted, and no "conclusive presumption" of intent s' instruction will be
given.
Second, the Gypsum case means that the defendant's sophistica-
tion may become important. The rule is not whether the defendant
"should have known," or whether a "reasonable man" would have
known, the standards which connote negligence, but whether the
defendant had knowledge of his conduct's probable consequences.
The vice president of sales for a Fortune 500 firm is more likely to
have such knowledge than the president of Mom 'n Pop's Grocery. 3
Third, it may be that the level of intent necessary with respect
to the agreement element of the crime must be determined.84 The
Court specifically did not address this issue,85 but the Model Penal
Code appears to require that the defendant be aware that his con-
duct is in the "nature" of an agreement. This might have some
relevance in so-called "tacit" or "inferred agreement" cases. 7
Finally, if lower courts read the Gypsum decision properly, sanc-
tions for criminal antitrust convictions should increase. By making
clear, that antitrust .violations are not strict liability crimes but
rather crimes requiring the government to prove intent, the Court
gave notice that the Sherman Act is now a marginally important
statute based "upon achievement of some social betterment rather
than the punishment of the crimes as in cases of mala in se," s as is
true with many strict liability offenses. Because violations are seri-
ous matters rather than "minor offenses . . . [with] petty penal-
ties,"89 intent must be proved, but penalties should be severe upon
conviction.
82. See note 59 supra.
83. Cf. Baker, Prosecutorial Discretion, supra, note 71 at 417: "Yet the naive innocence of
the exceptionally unsophisticated may deserve some weight in prosecutorial discretion."
84. Mr. Justice Brennan explained this possible ramification clearly in United States v.
Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 613-14 (1971), where he noted that "mens rea is not a unitary concept,
but may vary as to each element of a crime; . . . . To determine the mental element required
for conviction, each material element of the offense must be examined and the determination
made what level of intent Congress intended the Government to prove .
85. 98 S.Ct. at 2876-77 n.20.
86. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b)(i), supra note 55.
87. See, e.g., Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1965).
88. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922).
89. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 257 (1952) (quoting Tenement House Dept.
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III. Is A PURPOSE To PROTECT THE PUBLIC A SUFFICIENT DEFEN4SE? 90
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,9' the Court held that profes-
sions enjoy no blanket exemption from the antitrust laws. The deci-
sion indicated, however, that only "certain anticompetitive conduct
by lawyers is within the reach of the Sherman Act. .. *92
From this and the Court's now-famous footnote 17, which indi"
cated that self-imposed professional restrictions might be judged
differently than other restraints, 3 many thought there were inherent
characteristics of the professions which required an examination of
many competing interests, only one of which was economic competi-
tion, before legality could be ascertained. 4 It could have been
argued, for example, that since there are strong public service as-
pects to a professional's work, and because the effect of incompetent
work could be devastating, the benefits of economic competition
were of secondary importance. Indeed, several lower courts after
Goldfarb interpreted the footnote in just this manner.
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,96
however, the Supreme Court narrowed whatever comfort footnote 17
had provided and used the case as its vehicle for explaining that a
v. McDevitt, 215 N.Y. 160, 168, 109 N.E. 88, 90 (1915) (Cardozo, J., describing a common
characteristic of a strict liability crime as opposed to an "infamous" crime requiring proof of
intent for conviction)).
90. This portion of the article is adopted from Miles, Competition and Professional Codes
of Ethics - The Professional Engineers Decision, 4 VA. BAR ASs'N J. 15 (No. 4, 1978).
91. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
92. Id. at 793 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 788-89 n. 17:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business
is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the
Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchange-
able with other business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions anti-
trust concepts which originated in other areas. The public service aspect, and other
features of the profession, may require that a particular practice, which could properly
be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently.
We intimate no view on any other situation than the one with which we are confronted
today.
94. See generally Note, The Antitrust Liability of Professional Associations After Goldfarb:
Reformulating the Learned Professions Exemption in the Lower Courts, 1977 DUKE L. J. 1047.
95. See, e.g., Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 825 (1977); Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F. Supp. 1258
(N.D. Fla. 1976).
96. 98 S.Ct. 1355 (1978).
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restraint's effect on competition is the only salient variable in deter-
mining its legality.
The government's civil action, filed in 1972, challenged a section
of the Society's code of ethics which prohibited engineers from
"attempting to obtain employment or advancement or professional
engagements by competitive bidding.19 7 While the government
claimed that the prohibition constituted price fixing by eliminating
price competition, the Society argued that the provision was reason-
able because price competition would lead to shoddy engineering
work and subsequent disaster. The district court rejected this argu-
ment, noting that because the prohibition had "as its purpose and
effect the excision of price considerations from the competitive
arena of engineering services," it was a price fixing agreement, and
thus reasonableness need not even be considered.98
On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded in light of its decision
in Goldfarb.9" The district court again rejected a rule of reason ap-
proach,' °0 noting that the rule of reason had not been applied in
Goldfarb; that while footnote 17 apparently distinguished between
"a profession's business aspects and its valid self-regulatory
'restraints,' "101 the bidding prohibition had great commercial im-
pact; and that in "Goldfarb the Supreme Court had rejected
"reasonableness" arguments based on ruinous competition. The
97. Id. at 1360-61 n.3. Section 11(c) defined competitive bidding as the "formal or informal
submission, or receipt, of verbal or written estimates of cost or proposals in terms of dollars
. . or any other measure of compensation whereby the prospective client may compare
engineering services on a price basis prior to the time that one engineer. . . has been selected
for negotiations." Id. at 1361 n.3.
Several other professional associations were sued over similar practices at approximately
the same time and entered into consent decrees. United States v. American Inst. of Archi-
tects, [1972] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 73,981 (D.D.C. 1972); United States v. American
Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, [1972] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 74,007 (D.D.C. 1972);
United States v. American Soc'y of Civil Eng'rs, [1972] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 73,950
(S.D.N.Y. 1972) (subsequent contempt citation, [1977-2] TRADE REm. RsP. (CCH) 61,574
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1977)).
98. United States v. National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs, 389 F. Supp. 1193, 1200 (D.D.C. 1974),
vacated and rem'd, 422 U.S. 1031 (1975). The Society also argued that engineering was not
"trade or commerce" and thus not subject to the Sherman Act. The court rejected this
argument, calling it "a dangerous form of elitism." 389 F. Supp. at 1198. Also rejected was a
state action exemption argument because there was no state mandate or supervision.
99. National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 422 U.S. 1031 (1975).
100. United States v. National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs, 404 F. Supp. 457 (D.D.C. 1975),
modified, 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'd, 98 S.Ct. 1355 (1978).
101. Id. at 461.
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court of appeals affirmed, ,02 holding that no full-blown rule of reason
inquiry was necessary because although "[t]he Society may not
have engaged in direct price fixing as such . . . its prohibition of
free price competition is not far removed, in both legal and practical
consequence."' 0 3
Before the Supreme Court, the Society admitted that the canon
was anticompetitive but argued that competitive bidding would
lead to corner-cutting and poor quality work' 4 and thus that the
proscription was reasonable. The government argued that since the
prohibition prevented price competition, the per se rule had been
properly applied.0 5
The Court framed the issue before it as "whether the canon may
be justified under the Sherman Act. . . because it was adopted by
members of a learned profession for the purpose of :minimizing the
risk that competition would produce inferior engineering work en-
dangering the public safety," or more simply, "whether the District
Court should have considered the factual basis for the proffered
justification before rejecting it."'° Holding that the "asserted de-
fense rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of the Rule of Rea-
son,"'0 7 the Court unanimously rejected the Society's argument.'0
Disagreeing that footnote 17 mandated a full-blown analysis of
the restraint even if the prohibition were intended to mitigate harm
to public safety which competitive bidding might create,' 9 the
102. National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 555 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'd,
98 S.Ct. 1355 (1978).
103. Id. at 981.
104. The Society's arguments made in support of the canon's reasonableness were strik-
ingly similar to those made by the bar, but rejected by the Court in its first amendment
analysis in Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977), e.g., that purchasers would be
misled, quality lowered and the dignity of the profession destroyed. Petitioner's Brief for
Certiorari at 7-9, National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 98 S.Ct. 1355 (1978).
105. The government appeared to accept the argument that "antitrust law is flexible
enough to allow professional self-regulatory conduct that is designed primarily to protect the
public and is no more restrictive than necessary." Brief for the United States in Opposition
to Certiorari at 16, National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 98 S.Ct. 1355 (1978).
106. National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs. v. United States, 98 S.Ct. 1355, 1359-60 (1978).
107. Id. at 1360.
108. Id. Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the decision.
109. The Society argued as follows:
The relation of an ethical canon's scope to the evil which the canon seeks to root
out is an appropriate consideration for the courts in determining whether the canon is
reasonable. However, that comparison can be made rationally only if the court exam-
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Court went directly to the crux of its holding: "[c]ontrary to its
name, the Rule does not open the field of antitrust inquiry to any
argument in favor of a challenged restraint that may fall within the
realm of reason. Instead, it focuses directly on the challenged re-
straint's impact on competitive conditions.""' A court's examina-
tion should not focus on any alleged social betterment which the
restraint may promote; rather, the ultimate question for determina-
tion is whether the restraint is anticompetitive.
The Court noted that the Sherman Act drafters intended the
statute to be interpreted in harmony with common law precedent,
which emphasized the restraint's competitive impact,"' and that it
had emphasized the importance of economic analysis in Sherman
Act cases from 189711 - to the present.13 It concluded that whether
the effect of the restraint is "so plainly anticompetitive that no
elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish [its] illegal-
ity,' ' 14 in which case the per se rule applies, or whether a broader
examination is necessary, the determinant of a practice's legality is
its effect on competition."15
The Court foreclosed the success of arguments that market im-
perfections preclude competition from working;"' that competition
ines the evil at which the canon is aimed, in the context of the professional practices
involved.
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 17, National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs, 98 S.Ct. 1355 (1978).
110. 98 S.Ct. at 1363 (emphasis added).
111. By its approval of Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1. P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 374 (1711), a
case decided under common law principles, the court evidenced that a superficial appearance
of short-run anticompetitive effect may not be decisive. Mitchel was an ancillary restraints
case in which a merchant had sold his business and entered into a covenant not to compete
with the buyer. The covenant was held reasonable in subsequent litigation. In discussing the
relevance of Mitchel to the Engineers decision, the Court said, "[t]he long-run benefit of
enhancing the marketability of the business itself - and thereby providing incentives to
develop such an enterprise - outweighed the temporary and limited loss of competition."
98 S.Ct. at 1363-64.
112. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
113. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
114. 98 S.Ct. at 1365.
115. The Court said:
In either event, the purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about the competi-
tive significance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy favoring competi-
tion is in the public interest, or in the interest of the members of an industry. ...
[T]hat policy decision has been made by the Congress.
Id.
116. "The early cases also foreclose the argument that because of the special characteristics
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in general is "bad"; "7 that competition results in dangerous goolds;" 8
that competition promotes deception of the public,"9 or that lack of
competition otherwise benefits the public.'20 By enacting the Sher-
man Act, Congress chose competition as the country's system of
rationing scarce resources. Accordingly, any deviation from this sys-
tem also is the prerogative of Congress.
Goldfarb's footnote 17 did not change the proper analytical
framework by requiring or allowing courts to consider noneconomic
justifications just because the restraint is self-imposed by profes-
sionals. Rather, the footnote should be interpreted as a recognition
that because professional services differ in some respects from other
business services, the competitive effect of such restraints may be
different: "[e]thical norms may serve to regulate and promote this
competition, and thus fall within the Rule of Reason."' 2'
Because a restraint's effect on competition is the only proper de-
terminant of legality, the Court's decision on the facts before it
flowed a fortiori. The Society admitted that its rule restrained price
competition. Indeed, its very purpose was to prevent the harm
which the Society thought would flow from deceptively low bids by
stabilizing prices at an artificially high level. Thus, "[w]hile this
is not price fixing as such, no elaborate industry analysis is required
to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agree-
ment.' 12 2 The Court concluded that "on its face," the Society's pro-
of a particular industry, monopolistic arrangements will better promote trade and commerce
than competition." Id. at 1364.
117. "Even assuming occasional exceptions to the presumed consequences of competition,
the statutory policy precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or bad."
Id. at 1367.
118. "Exceptions to the Sherman Act for potentially dangerous goods and services would
be tantamount to a repeal of the statute." Id.
119. The Court said:
Certainly, the problem of professional deception is a proper subject of an ethical
canon. But. . .the equation of competition with deception. . . is simply too broad;
we may assume that competition is not entirely conducive to ethical behavior, but that
is not a reason, cognizable under the Sherman Act, for doing away with competition.
Id.
120. Id. at 1367-68.
121. Id.; cf. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918), which arose
in a strictly commercial context where the Court noted that "Itihe true test of legality is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition."
122. 98 S.Ct. at 1365. Clearly, the rule was within the broad definition of price fixing
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hibition violated section 1.'
Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Rehnquist, while agreeing
that the Society's rule violated section 1, dissented from their inter-
pretation of the majority's holding, i.e., "that any ethical rule with
an overall anticompetitive effect promulgated by a professional so-
ciety is forbidden.1 ' 24 Their thesis was that the Society's rule was
grossly overbroad, and thus it was not necessary to determine
whether variables other than competition could ever be considered.
Additionally, they were not ready to invalidate all professional regu-
lations which, although anticompetitive, might be necessary for the
profession's proper ordering. They were willing to read more flexibil-
ity for professions into footnote 17 than was the majority. 5
Engineers is the Court's latest chapter in the continuing saga of
the attempt to introduce the professions to economic competition.' 2
The decision already is having ramifications.' 27 The case is espe-
posited in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940), i.e., "a combi-
nation formed for the purpose and with the effect of . . . stabilizing the price." The rule
appears to be another example of what is sometimes called "indirect price fixing." See.United
States v. Nu-Phonics, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 1006 (E.D. Mich. 1977); see also notes 48 and 76
supra, and accompanying teyt.
123. The Court appears consciously to have refused to use the term "per se" in its analysis.
Notwithstanding that the opinion talks, in the main, about the rule of reason, and that there
is ambiguous language such as "[i]t is this restraint that must be justified under the Rule
of Reason," 98 S.Ct. at 1367, the Court's short-cut analysis of the prohibition and its citation
to United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), lead inexorably to the
conclusion that a per se standard was used. Also, compare text accompanying note 117 supra
with text accompanying note 109 supra. In reality, because reasonableness has been read into
the Sherman Act's prohibition of restraints, see Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231 (1918), the rule of reason is applicable in every antitrust case. The per se standard
is simply a short-cut method of determining reasonableness. See generally SuLLVA, supra,
note 41 at 193.
124. 98 S.Ct. at 1369 (Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in part).
125. Also at issue in the case, but not discussed here, were certain provisions of the district
court's decree which: (1) enjoined the Society from stating that competitive bidding is unethi-
cal, and (2) required it to state affirmatively that, indeed, competitive bidding is not unethi-
cal. The court of appeals upheld the first provision but felt the second was unnecessary and
thus violated the first amendment. 555 F.2d at 984. The Supreme Court affirmed, although
the Chief Justice felt that both of the provisions were unconstitutional. 98 S.Ct. at 1370
(Burger, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
126. Signs are good that the public is beginning to recognize the benefits of competition
among professionals. An editorial in Bus. WEEK, July 24, 1978, at 182, noted that "most of
the professions could benefit from an injection of old-fashioned competition."
127. In United States v. Tex. State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, [1978-1] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 62,039 (W.D. Tex. May 5, 1978), a rule of the Board which prohibited accountants
from submitting competitive bids was declared illegal per se.
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cially important in light of the Court's recent decisions which' nar-
row the scope of the state action exemption. l2 While Engineers
involved a code of ethics provision promulgated and enforced by a
private association, by contrast, the state often promulgates, by
statute or agency rule, ethics provisions for regulated professions
and occupations which have adverse impact on competition.
Although a full discussion of the state action exemption is beyond
the scope of this section of the article, 29 it appears that to sustain
the exemption the challenged action must have been mandated or
at least contemplated by the legislature or some other sovereign
branch of state government as part of a regulatory scheme intended
to replace competition in the relevant product or service market. In
addition, where the state agency promulgating the challenged con-
duct is a self-regulatory board, i.e., composed of industry members,
and where effects of their action could inure to their economic bene-
fit, their action must be closely supervised by a nonfinancially inter-
ested, superior state body. 3 ' Where the state action exemption can-
not be sustained, the agency, and especially its regulatees, may be
in trouble.' 3' Regulation of professionals by themselves is not, and
should not be, a thing of the past, but professionals have been put
on notice that they will receive no special treatment under the anti-
trust laws. Each professional association and state regulatory board
should examine its code of ethics and other rules carefully to assure
that no antitrust violation exists.
The ramifications of the decision, however, are much broader
than the legality of a competitive bidding prohibition or the proper
analytical framework for assessing professional restraints. The deci-
sion goes to the heart of the antitrust laws, the policies upon which
they are based and their proper interpretation. The Court made
128. City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 98 S.Ct. 1123 (1978); Bates v. State Bar
of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Cantor.v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
129. See notes 139-45 infra and accompanying text.
130. See generally I.P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRusT
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 71-91 (1978) [hereinafter cited to as AREEDA & TURNER].
131. A recent example is United States v. Tex. State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, supra note
122. An argument that the rule was protected by the state action exemption was rejected
because the rule was not mandated by the state and the accountancy statutes did not contem-
plate such a restraint. Although each rule of the Board had to be approved by a referendum
of the Board's regulatees, this unusual factor was not relied on in denying the exemption.
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crystal clear that the relevant inquiry in all antitrust cases is the
restraint's economic impact. A future battleground will be the de-
lineation of what is "anticompetitive" and what is not. First
"competition" must be defined. Professor Bork sets forth five possi-
ble definitions1 2 and, relying on "Chicago-school" economic philos-
ophy, rejects the concept of rivalry and opts for equating competi-
tion with allocative and productive efficiency. Maximization of ri-
valry, the definition most often accepted by the courts, 3' and max-
imization of efficiency are often at odds. '34
In addition, the Court's reliance upon common law precedent and
the ancillary restraints doctrine evidences that while a balancing of
competitive impact and other social goals is improper, a balancing
of short-run and long-run competitive effects is not. Defendantswill
rely on the Court's approval of Mitchel v. Reynolds' 5 and argue that
while the immediate effect of a restraint appears to be elimination
of competition, the long-run effect is procompetitive. In addition,
there must be an examination of all possible competitive effects
rather than only the most obvious. 3 We can expect some strange
arguments explaining why a certain practice which appears anti-
competitive is not.
A close examination of Engineers demonstrates that not all re-
straints with anticompetitive effects are illegal. The Court recog-
nized this when it noted that if section 1 were read literally, every
contract would be illegal. 37 Rather, as Professor Sullivan notes, a
rule of reason analysis condemns agreements "which in purpose or
132. R. BoRK, THE ANrUST PARADox: A PoucY ,T WAR wrrm InSEL.F 58-61 (1978). His
alternative definitions are: (1) the process of rivalry; (2) absence of control by one person over
another's economic activities; (3) the economist's model, where buyers and sellers are "price-
takers," rather than entities whose actions affect price; (4) a system of atomistic buyers and
sellers preserved by protecting small business; and (5) a state where consumer welfare cannot
be increased because efficiency is maximized.
133. See SuLLuvAN, supra, note 41 at 153.
134. In fact, the Society implicitly argued that its ban promoted efficiency. Allocative
efficiency, i.e., assuring that "resources are employed in tasks where consumers value their
output most,"BoRK, supra, note 127 at 91, is promoted by prohibiting engineering work which
results in dangerous buildings.
135. See note 106 supra.
136. Cf. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (while destroying
intrabrand competition, vertical territorial restraints may enhance interbrand competition
and thus be legal).
137. 98 S.Ct. at 1363.
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likely effect will significantly restrict competition."1 8 A per se anal-
ysis does the same; the difference is simply that under the per se
rule the necessary degree of restraint is presumed. Perhaps, there-
fore, the concurring justices were overly concerned with the deci-
sion's effect on professional ethics provisions. At the least, the ethi-
cal restriction need not promote competition to be valid as they
suggest. '39
Perhaps the most disturbing facet of the opinion is the Court's
seemingly conscious failure to use the phrase "per se." Surely this
deletion would not be important were it not clear that this Court is
less willing to allow per se analyses than the Warren Court."' During
the 1977 Term, the Court made clear that use of the per se standard
is the exception rather than the rule, holding that it only should be
applied where the conduct is "manifestly anticompetitive,"'' or has
a "demonstrable [adverse] economic effect." 4 '
This trend toward more reliance on demonstrated economic im-
pact in determining legality is proper. On the other hand, if the
Court's failure to simply label the restriction per se illegal is an
indication of a further retreat from using a per Se analysis, the
pendulum may have swung too far in the other direction.
IV. Is MUNICIPAL ACTION SUBJECT To THE ANTITRUST LAWS?
The Court extended its streak of state action exemption cases to
four straight terms by deciding City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co."' This time, however, the application was unique: the
actions of two cities were challenged under the Sherman Act, and
the cities argued that their conduct was exempt.
In Parker v. Brown,'44 the Supreme Court determined that Con-
gress never intended the antitrust laws to apply to restraints of trade
138. SULLIVAN, supra, note 129 at 187.
139. See note 119 supra and accompanying text.
140. Compare Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) with United
States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
141. Continental T.V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 50.
142. Id. at 59. Some hostility toward the per se rule also can be gleaned from the Court's
decision last Term in United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610
(1977).
143. City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 98 S.Ct. 1123 (1978).
144. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
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imposed by states "as sovereign" through "an act of government."' 45
This judicially created state-action doctrine' 8 remained unqualified
by the Court for thirty years. The long hiatus ended in 1975, with
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,47 which narrowed the state action
exemption by holding that only anticompetitive actions mandated
by the State are immune from attack. Goldfarb was followed by
Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 4 and Bates v. State Bar of Arizona. 149
The result of all this sudden interest by the Court is a great deal of
uncertainty. 0
Lafayette began its legal journey two years before the Goldfarb
decision.' 5 ' The cities, plaintiffs in the original action, alleged viola-
tions of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by Louisiana Power &
Light.'5 2 The utility counterclaimed, alleging that the cities had
violated the antitrust laws by engaging in sham litigation and re-
quiring customers outside city boundaries to purchase electricity
from the cities as a condition to the purchase of gas and water.'53
Acting on the basis of prior holdings within the Fifth Circuit 54
and without benefit of Goldfarb, the district court reluctantly dis-
missed the counterclaims, holding that the cities' activities consti-
145. Id. at 352.
146. The Parker Court held that, based upon principles of federalism, the antitrust laws
were inapplicable to certain anticompetitive actions of the states. Thus, no exemption, as
such, was created. However, commentators and courts alike refer to the "state action exemp-
tion," the "Parker exemption," "Parker immunity," and the like.
See generally Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An Unprecedented Su-
preme Court Term-1977, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 979, 1005 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Handler];
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 125, at 212-13.
147. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
148. 428 U.S. 579 (1977). Cantor was a suit against an investor-owned utility that chal-
lenged the utility's practice of giving free lightbulbs to its customers. Notwithstanding that
the practice was approved by the state public utility commission as part of the utility's tariff,
the Court, in a fragmented decision, refused to sustain a state action exemption claim.
149. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
150. The district court in Lafayette admitted that this was an area of law "as to which
there is substantial ground for difference of opinion." [1975-1] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
60,240 (E.D. La. 1975).
151. The case was filed on July 24, 1973.
152. 98 S.Ct. at 1126 n.5.
153. Id. n.6.
154. See Saenz v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 487 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973), which in-
volved an alleged boycott of plaintiff's slide rule by plaintiff's competitor and a state agency.
The Fifth Circuit held that defendants' status as state officials and state agencies conferred
complete immunity. Id. at 1028.
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tuted state action. '55 Based upon the intervening Goldfarb decision,
a unanimous Fifth Circuit reversed and instructed the lower court
to "determine whether the activities alleged fall within the intended
scope of the powers granted to the Cities by the legislature." '' 58
In four separate opinions with no clear majority, the Supreme
Court affirmed, five to four. 57 The cities argued, first, that aside
from the Parker "state action" exemption, Congress did not intend
the antitrust laws to apply to the anticompetitive actions of munici-
palities. Second, they argued that the state action doctrine, itself,
precluded application of the antitrust laws to them.
A majority of the Court rejected the first argument, noting that
because cities were "persons" capable of suing within the meaning
of antitrust statutes, ' logic dictated that they could be sued unless
some overriding policy mandated otherwise.'59 Only two policies had
ever borne sufficient weight to overcome the presumption against
implied exclusion: promoting the free flow of information from citi-
zens to the government even if for anticompetitive purposes, a pol-
icy embodied in the first amendment;' and principles of federalism
whereby states are considered sovereign within our dual system of
government, the policy underlying the state action exemption.'' As
neither applied, the cities attempted to establish new policy justifi-
cations, arguing first, "that it would be anomalous to subject mu-
nicipalities to the criminal and civil liabilities imposed upon viola-
tors of the antitrust laws."'6 2 The Court effectively sidestepped this
155. City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., [1975-1] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
60,240, p. 65,950 (E.D. La., 1975).
156. City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1976).
157. Justice Brennan wrote for the plurality of Marshall, Powell and Stevens. The Chief
Justice wrote a separate concurrence. Justice Stewart dissented for White and Rehnquist.
Justice Blackmun dissented separately.
158. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906); see Ga.
v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942) (the language in section 7 of the Sherman Act (now section 4
of the Clayton Act) which allows suits by "[a]ny person injured in his business or property"
includes states).
159. 98 S.Ct. at 1128.
160. This is the basis for the Noerr-Pennington, or government solicitation, exemption. See
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); E.R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
161. Federalism was the underlying basis for the Parker decision. See Olsen v. Smith, 195
U.S. 332 (1904); Handler, supra, note 141 at 1005-06; Handler, The Current Attack on the
Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 4-18 (1972).
162. 98 S.Ct. at 1130. This argument was actually given little attention in the briefs. See
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argument, noting that while cities are subject to many federal
laws,'63 it was not necessary to determine, in this case, the appropri-
ate remedy against cities violating the antitrust laws." 4 The cities
then argued that "the antitrust laws are intended to protect the
public only from abuses of private power and not from actions of
municipalities that exist to serve the public weal.""' 5 The Court
rebutted this argument by stating that public restraints can harm
competition to the same extent as private anticompetitive behavior.
Moreover, the restraints in the instant case coerced those outside
the municipality who had no political recourse."6
The second major question presented by Lafayette was whether
the Parker doctrine precluded application of the antitrust laws.
Here Chief Justice Burger departed from the plurality, and the
Court split decisively in answering the question.
Rejected convincingly was the notion held by many"6 7 that
"governmental entities, whether state agencies or subdivisions of a
state, are, simply by reason of their status as such, exempt from the
antitrust laws.""' The plurality read Parker, Bates and Goldfarb as
holding that only where states act as sovereign will the antitrust
laws stand aside."9 "Parker's limitation of the exemption to 'official
Brief for Petitioners at 21, 23, 98 S.Ct. 1123 (1978); Brief for Respondents at 21, 98 S.Ct. 1123
(1978).
163. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941) (Elkins Act, 49 U.S.C.
§ 41 (1970), applicable to municipalities).
164. According to the Court, Union Pacific, 313 U.S. 450 (1941), and other similar cases
"do not require the conclusion that remedies appropriate to redress violations by private
corporations would be equally appropriate for municipalities; nor need we decide any ques-
tion of remedy in this case." 98 S.Ct. at 1131. Mr. Justice Brennan said that the question of
appropriate remedies could be addressed only upon a finding of liability by the district court.
See note 184 infra and accompanying text.
165. 98 S.Ct. at 1131.
166. See note 148 supra. The Court emphasized that the utility and its shareholders and
customers, as well as non-resident customers of the cities, were potential victims of the
alleged violations, and all are left without realistic and potential political redress.
167. Here, for example, Mr. Justice Stewart argued that the status of the defendant rather
than the nature of the activity should have been dispositive. 98 S.Ct. at 1144 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
168. 98 S.Ct. at 1134.
169. It said that:
[Tihe determinant of the exemption [in Parker] was whether the challenged action
was "an act of government" by the State as "sovereign." Parker repeatedly empha-
sized that the anticompetitive effects of California's prorate program derived from "the
state['s] command;" the state adopted, organized, and enforced the program "in the
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action directed by the state,' . . . is consistent with the fact that
the States' subdivisions generally have not been treated as equiva-
lents of the States themselves.' 7 0 Therefore, cities are not sover-
eign.
Under what circumstances, then, can actions by municipalities
qualify for Parker immunity? The Court's short answer was when-
ever they are executing a clear "state policy to displace competition
with regulation or monopoly public service.'" 7 In deciding what
constituted a sufficient expression of such a policy, the plurality
affirmed the standard which the Fifth Circuit had adopted: The
state legislature must have contemplated the anticompetitive ac-
tion complained of.'7 1 If no such contemplation can be found, the
antitrust laws must be obeyed.
In his concurrence, Chief Justice Burger posited a stricter test
than the plurality. Noting that Parker was decided upon principles
of federalism, he urged that the decision be put into historical
perspective. Since federalism is an evolving precept, so must the
state action doctrine be evolutionary. Parker was based upon the
"requirements of a dual system of government" in 1943, and was not
"cast in bronze." The current acceptance of increased federal in-
volvement in the affairs of the states dictates a narrowing of the
exemption. 71
The Chief Justice then entered the very "quagmire" that the
Fifth Circuit had tried to avoid: the proprietary/governmental dis-
execution of a governmental policy."
Id. at 1135 (footnotes omitted).
Goldfarb "made it clear that, for purposes of the Parker doctrine not every act of a state
agency is that of the State as sovereign." Id. The Bates Court found the exemption because
the restraint was "compelled" by the "ultimate body wielding the State's power over the
practice of law," emphasizing the fact that "the state policy requiring the anticompetitive
restraint as part of a comprehengive regulatory system, was one clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed as state policy and that the state's policy was actively supervised by
the State Supreme Court as the policymaker." Id. (quoting Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350,
360 (1977) & Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975)). For a more thorough
analysis of all three cases see Miles, Socking It to Plaintiffs: Supreme Court Antitrust Deci-
sions in the 1976-77 Term, 12 U. RICH. L. Rav. 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Miles].
170. 98 S.Ct. at 1136.
171. Id. at 1137.
172. Id. at 1138.
173. 98 S.Ct. at 1141 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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tinction. 7  Where the activity in question is determined to be pro-
prietary, the court should then analyze the problem as if a private
party were claiming Parker immunity. First, the Goldfarb
"threshold inquiry" must be met: Is the activity required by the
State acting as sovereign? 1 5 An affirmative answer is necessary but
not dispositive. In addition, he would require that the test for other
implied exemptions be sustained, i.e., an exemption is necessary for
the regulatory scheme to work, and the restraint imposed is the least
onerous necessary.'
There still appear to be four Justices who would grant immunity
based solely on the identity of the parties. They argue that immun-
ity attaches to the government and its officials but not to private
parties, even if their anticompetitive activities are mandated by the
government. Justice Stewart wrote another vigorous dissent based
primarily upon arguments of public policy and the perceived effects
of the majority's holding. 7 The list of horribles imagined by the
dissents of both Justice Stewart and Justice Blackmun was exten-
sive: the decline in the ability of states to delegate power and re-
sponsibility to their municipalities; 8 cities having to ask the legis-
lature to compel almost every act of the municipality;'79 the discour-
agement of local "experimentation with innovative social and eco-
nomic programs;""' and the imposition of "staggering costs on the
174. The Fifth Circuit had said that,
[als a final point, we cannot accept defendant's invitation to import the discredited
proprietary-governmental distinction into this area of the law. This contention is un-
supported by authority and is irrelevant under Parker and Goldfarb, which look only
to the scope of the legislative action and not the "proprietary" or "governmental"
nature of the subordinate governmental body's conduct.
City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 532 F.2d 431, 434 n.8 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'd 98
S.Ct. 1123 (1978).
The Chief Justice noted that he used the distinction "only to focus attention on the fact
that all of the parties are in a competitive relationship." 98 S.Ct. at 1141 n.3 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
The plurality, too, avoided having to make this formal distinction. The "business" nature
of the city-run utility was, however, mentioned several times. E.g., 98 S.Ct. at 1131.
175. 98 S.Ct. at 1143 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
176. Id. Justice Marshall wrote a brief concurring opinion on this point. He agreed with
the Chief Justice but felt that the plurality's approach incorporated the "least onerous alter-
native" within it. 98 S.Ct. at 1139 (Marshall, J., concurring).
177. 98 S.Ct. at 1144 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 1148.
179. Id. at 1149-50.
180. Id. at 1150.
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thousands of municipal governments.""'8 Both dissenting opinions
criticize the plurality for arguing that treble damages may not be
appropriate in suits against cities without explaining how the man-
datory treble damage statute can be avoided.1 2
Of all the antitrust decisions of this Term, Lafayette promises to
affect more people than any other. The governing bodies of every
locality will now be forced to sit down with their attorney and care-
fully examine the instances in which the local government enters
the marketplace. Entrance may take one of three forms: monopolist,
regulator, or purchaser.
Where a municipality wishes to dispense a service on a monopoly
basis, foreclosing the market completely, there must be enabling
legislation from the state legislature. How specific and extensive
this authorization need be is dependent upon the nature of the
actions to be taken by the locality. Where the municipality wishes
to displace a private firm with a public monopoly through either
local ordinance or anticompetitive conduct, something more than a
general enabling statute will be necessary. The exact degree of spe-
cificity required becomes a function of several factors: the extent of
the anticompetitive effects, the extent to which these effects are felt
outside the boundaries of the municipality, the egregiousness of the
anticompetitive conduct, and the common practice within the state.
Fewer problems arise where the locality wishes simply to regulate
a sector of the economy without entering the market. Zoning regula-
tions are an example of conduct which, although possibly anticom-
petitive, normally would not be violations of the antitrust laws since
all action is unilateral and not in furtherance of a monopoly."'
181. Id. at 1151.
182. Id. n.30; 98 S.Ct. at 1152 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun criticized the
"nonchalance with which the Court puts aside the question of remedy." 98 S.Ct. at 1152
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). He noted the mandatory nature of § 4 of the Clayton Act but
then cited to his Cantor concurrence which suggested an equally unsupportable defense to
damages based upon fairness. Id.
183. An example of this is city regulation of adult bookstores, massage parlors and other
activities through restrictive zoning. Surely this restrains trade in the market for pornogra-
phy, but the action is unilateral. There is no agreement and therefore no § 1 violation.
Further, since the city does not compete in the dispensing of these goods and services, there
is no § 2 monopolization. But see Whitworth v. Perkins, 559 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1977) (allega-
tions that a zoning ordinance was adopted in furtherance of a private conspiracy stated valid
antitrust claim).
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The last and most vulnerable situation is exclusive dealing by the
municipality.' 4 This would include direct purchasing by the local
government as well as purchasing on behalf of its citizens, i.e., the
awarding of an exclusive franchise.1es It is clear now that absent
state authorization such contracts carry no immunity. ' Lack of
blanket immunity, however, does not mean that cities will be forced
to either abandon the practice or run to the legislature for authoriza-
tion of every contract. But where a municipality awards an exclu-
sive franchise the city must examine the contract in terms of its
competitive effects and degree of market foreclosure.'87
So long as the contract is legal under the antitrust laws, of course,
no authorization is needed. Further, there appears to be no reason
why municipalities cannot grant legal franchises. As noted by Pro-
fessors Areeda and Turner, most of a municipality's participation
in the marketplace does not, by necessity, involve encroachment
upon the antitrust laws. 8
However, just as businesses violate the antitrust laws through
either innocent ignorance or purposeful design, cities will also. This
raises the most troublesome aspect of the Court's opinion, the ques-
tion of liability for damages. While the plurality in Lafayette im-
plied that it may not be proper to assess treble damages against a
municipality, the language of section 4 of the Clayton Act is manda-
tory ' 9 as was so cogently pointed out in Justice Blackmun's dis-
sent.""5- No legal theory and little legal precedent 9 ' exists which
184. See generally SULLvAN, supra note 41 at 471-90.
185. This would include such operations as a cable television franchise, taxicab stands at
airports, and concessions at sports arenas.
186. See Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277 (3rd Cir. 1975). This case arose from
concession operations at city-owned facilities. The case, relied on heavily by the Fifth Circuit
in Lafayette, declined to find an exemption "absent state authority which demonstrates that
it is the intent of the state to restrain competition in a given area." Id. at 1280.
187. See, e.g., Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (Standard Stations).
188. AREMA & TuRNER, supra, note 125 at 103-05.
189. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.-§ 15-(1973),- provides that'[a~ny-person-who-
shall be injured. . . by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor
.. .and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained. . . ." (emphasis added).
A majority of the Court and such notable commentators as Professors Areeda and Turner
question the propriety of treble damages against state and local governments. AREEDA &
TuRNER, supra note 125, at 101-08. A similar argument against treble damages was made in
Cantor, 428 U.S. at 579, 614-15 n.6.
189.1. 98 S.Ct. at 1152 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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supports the proposition that a defendant who violates the antitrust
laws is not liable for money damages or subject only to single dam-
ages. This appears to be an area for Congressional action.
The implications of Lafayette are certain to be far-reaching. They
are also, just as certainly, not going to be the disaster envisioned by
the dissent. But, like it or not, county and city governments had
best heed the warning of a senior Justice Department official to
examine local government's forays into the marketplace in terms of
"competitive impact" and "potential antitrust exposure if that
impact is anticompetitive.""'
V. THE EXCEPTION To THE EXEMPTION: HOW To READ A
CONGRESSIONAL DOUBLE NEGATIVE.
While Lafayette"12 dealt with the judicially created state action
exemption, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry"3 was one
of two cases'94 last Term which dealt with a statutory exemption.
The McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act"15 (McCarran
Act) largely exempts the "business of insurance" from the antitrust
as well as other federal laws to the extent it is regulated by the
states."'
190. See Rogers v. Douglas Tobacco Bd. of Trade, 244 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1957); Haskell v.
Perkins, 28 F.2d 222 (D.N.J. 1928), rev'd on other grounds, 31 F.2d 53 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
279 U.S. 872 (1929). Both cases involved deceased defendants. The courts reasoned that the
personal representatives and estates should not be liable for treble damages. Both cases are
treated as anomolies by those circuit courts specifically rejecting pleas for single damages.
See Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corp., 429 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1970); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp., 281 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1960); Sun Theatre Corp. v. RKO Radio
Pictures, Inc., 213 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1954).
191. Address by Joe Sims, former Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
Antitrust Comes to Main Street, quoted in Hills, Fallout From Lafayette: Many Potential
Suits Face Cities, States, LEGAL TIMEs OF WASINGTON, June 26, 1978, at 19, col. 1.
192. City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 98 S.Ct. 1123 (1978). See Part IV supra.
193. 98 S.Ct. 2923 (1978).
194. The other was National Broiler Marketing Ass'n v. United States, 98 S.Ct. 2122
(1978), discussed in Part VI infra.
195. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976).
196. Section 1 of the Act states its purpose:
Congress declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States
of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of
Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of
such business by the several States.
15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1976).
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The McCarran Act was a congressional reaction to the Court's
1944 decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association'7 that insurance was interstate commerce and thus sub-
ject to the Sherman Act."18 Within a year, Congress had passed the
McCarran Act, a statute which can be characterized as "reverse
preemption" because it allows state laws to preempt federal regula-
tion to the extent that the state laws relate to the business of insur-
ance.
In section 2(b) of the McCarran Act, Congress allowed federal
antitrust laws to remain applicable only "to the extent that [the
business of insurance] is not regulated by State law." '99 The inter-
pretation of this section and the meaning of the phrase "business
of insurance" have been the subject of most appellate opinions re-
garding the exemption and the only questions which have been
examined by the Court.00
Section 3(b) excepts "boycotts, coercion [and] intimidation"
from the section 2(b) exemption thus making them subject to Sher-
man Act challenge.20 ' The exception was added so that practices
such as those in South-Eastern Underwriters, i.e., blacklisting inde-
197. 322 U.S. 533 (1944). South-Eastern Underwriters Association (S.E.U.A.) was com-
posed of 200 privately-owned fire insurance companies, which controlled 90 percent of the
relevant, six-state market.
The conspirators not only fixed premium rates and agents' commissions, but employed
boycotts together with other types of coercion and intimidation to force non-member
insurance companies into the conspiracies, and to compel persons who needed insur-
ance to buy only from S.E.U.A. members on S.E.U.A. terms.
Id. at 535. The Court held that the business of insurance traversed state lines and was,
therefore, interstate commerce. Further, Congress had shown no intent "to exempt the busi-
ness of insurance from the operation of the Sherman Act." St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
v. Barry, 98 S.Ct. 2923, 2928 (1978) (footnote omitted) (discussing S.E.U.A.).
198. This reversed the long-standing precedent of Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168
(1868).
199. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b)(1976).
200. See, e.g., SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969); FTC v. National Cas. Co.,
357 U.S. 560 (1958); Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 917 (1972). For a more thorough discussion of § 2(b) of the McCarran
Act and its judicial interpretation, see generally Note, Qualified Immunity for Insurers Under
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 396 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Qualified
Immunity]; Comment, The McCarran Act's Antitrust Exemption For "The Business of
Insurance": A Shrinking Umbrella, 43 TENN. L. REv. 329 (1976).
201. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1976): "Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the said
Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of
boycott, coercion, or intimidation."
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pendent agents, could be stopped even though they constituted the
business of insurance. Barry was the first opportunity for the Su-
preme Court to address the issue of what constitutes "boycott, coer-
cion [and] intimidation" under section 3(b).
Few cases involving section 3(b) arose until the late 1950's.1°1
Early cases appear to have interpreted boycotts broadly. Although
all involved boycotts of other insurance companies or insurance
agents by an insurance company, none of the opinions limited the
interpretation of boycott to those having targets within the indus-
try. 2
03
In Transnational Insurance Co. v. Rosenrund,204 however, a dis-
trict court noted in dicta that "[tihe legislative history shows that
the boycott, coercion and intimidation exception, was placed in the
legislation to protect insurance agents from the issuance by insur-
ance companies of a 'black-list.' "205 Although the "legislative his-
tory" cited was the remarks of one non-sponsoring Congressman
who later took issue with this interpretation,"'0 this one paragraph
became the entire basis for later narrow interpretations of section
3(b).
The early 1970's saw a marked increase in suits relying on section
202. See California League of Independent Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 179
F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Cal. 1959); United States v. New Orleans Ins. Exch., 148 F. Supp. 915
(E.D. La.), aff'd per curiam 355 U.S. 22 (1957); Miley v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
148 F. Supp. 299 (D.C. Mass.), aff'd per curiam 242 F.2d 758 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
828 (1957); United States v. Insurance Bd., 144 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ohio 1956).
The New Orleans Exchange case contains the most complete discussion of section 3(b). The
court analyzed the challenged practice in terms of purpose, effects on competition, and
methods of enforcement. The major evil found by the court was the intent and result of
foreclosure of free access to the market of insurance. 148 F. Supp. at 920; see also Battle v.
Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1110 (1975).
203. "These [boycott] provisions of the Sherman Act remain in full force and effect." New
Orleans Exchange, 148 F. Supp. at 922, n.23. "Congress made it clear that agreements to
boycott or acts of boycott affecting the insurance business remain at all times within the
effective ban of the Sherman Act." Insurance Bd., 144 F. Supp. at 690 (emphasis added).
204. 261 F. Supp. 12 (D. Ore. 1966).
205. Id. at 26.
206. See 91 CONG. REc. 1087 (1945) (remarks of Rep. Cellar); see also Note, Qualified
Immunity, supra note 195, at 413 n.111 (quoting [1975] 696 ANTrrRUST & TRADE Rxo. REP.
(BNA) at A-5): "'By no stretch of the imagination can any remarks [in the legislative
history] be construed as intended to limit the applicability of the Sherman Act to antitrust
acts among insurance companies and agents for the purpose of boycott or coercion among
insurance companies and agents.'"
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3(b) to escape the exemption. Several district courts27 and two cir-
cuit courts"'5 relied on Transnational and adopted the theory that
boycotts within the meaning of section 3(b) did not include those
of policyholders and others outside the insurance industry. A defi-
nite split had developed over the last two years with three circuits
adopting a broader reading of section 3(b),2 holding that it was not
limited to boycotts within the industry. With such a diametric split,
the area was ripe for review by the Supreme Court.21 1
In Barry, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., the largest medi-
cal malpractice insurer in Rhode Island, announced that all new and
renewed policies would be on less favorable terms than had been
offered in the past. Barry and other plaintiff physicians found that
the other three Rhode Island malpractice insurers had agreed with
St. Paul not to write new policies of any kind for any of St. Paul's
previous customers, thereby forcing these customers to assent to St.
Paul's new terms.21
Justice Powell wrote the opinion for the majority of seven.1 After
disposing of a mootness question not raised by either party213 and
reviewing the lower courts' holdings in the case,1 the Court first
discussed the general, non-legal definition of boycott. "The generic
concept of boycott refers to a method of pressuring a party with
whom one has a dispute by withholding, or enlisting others to with-
hold, patronage or services from the target." ' 5 Next, the definition
of boycott for Sherman Act purposes was addressed. Rejected was
207. See, e.g., McIlhenny v. American Title Ins. Co., 418 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
For a more complete list, see Qualified Immunity, supra note 195, at 411 n.93.
208. See Meicler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 506 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1975); Addrisi v. Equita-
ble Life Assurance Soc'y, 503 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975).
209. See Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977), petition
for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3294 (U.S. Oct. 19, 1977) (No. 77-580); Barry v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1977); Ballard v. Blue Shield, 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977).
210. Certiorari was denied in Addrisi and Ballard, but granted in Bany; the Court has not
decided what to do with Proctor. For some reason, Proctor was not remanded in light of Barry.
211. 98 S.Ct. at 2926-27.
212. Justices Stewart and Rehnquist dissented.
213. 98 S.Ct. at 2927-28.
214. Id. at 2929.
215. Id. at 2930 (footnote omitted). For a thorough discussion of boycotts under the Sher-
man Act, cited with approval by the Court, Id. n.11, see Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on
Non-commercial Concerted Refusals to Deal, 1970 DuKE L. J. 247.
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the argument of the insurance companies that the target of the
boycott must have been in competition with the boycotters. '" The
specific facts in Barry were then compared with the boycott defini-
tion to determine whether they constituted an illegal boycott under
the Sherman Act. In reaching the affirmative, the Court noted that
the refusal to deal in this case was total, i.e., a refusal to deal under
any terms, as opposed to a refusal to deal only under specified
terms."7 Also recognized by the Court was St. Paul's use of the
agreement with the other three companies as an enforcement mech-
anism against its policyholders.2 18
The Court then turned to whether a boycott under section 3(b)
was in any way different from a boycott under the Sherman Act.
The Court looked first to the legislative history. After examining
conflicting passages, it determined that the definition of boycott is
"broad and unqualified. ' 219 If Congress had desired a narrow defini-
tion of boycott, it should have been explicit. Ambiguous legislative
history cannot counter what is clear in the statute itself.20
Based, then, on the general meaning of "boycott," its definition
under section 1 of the Sherman Act, and that Congress apparently
did not intend for it to have a special meaning in the McCarran Act,
the Court held that "boycott" under section 3(b) is not limited to
boycotts of competitors or boycotts by insurance companies of other
insurance companies or agents.
But Justice Powell stopped short of holding that "boycott" is
synonymous for McCarran and Sherman Act purposes, for in the
final portion of the opinion, the Court noted that one question re-
mained to be answered, viz., "whether the type of private conduct
alleged to have taken place . . . constitutes a 'boycott' within the
meaning of section 3(b) ."221 That this question needed to be an-
swered implies that conduct constituting a section 1 Sherman boy-
cott may not, necessarily, fall within section 3(b).
While the Court did not explain in what ways, if any, the defini-
216. 98 S.Ct. at 2931. But see SuniuvAN, supra, note 41 at 256-59.
217. 98 S.Ct. at 2932.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 2934.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 2935.
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tion of boycott under the two provisions differs, it did leave clues
which appear important in determining whether a boycott falls
within the section 3(b) exception to the McCarran Act exemption.
Indeed, as in determining whether section 1 has been violated, pur-
pose and effect appear paramount. Importance was placed on the
answers to four questions: First, was there an anti-competitive pur-
pose behind the alleged boycott agreement?22  Second, were the ef-
fects of the boycott anti-competitive?m Third, did the boycott pro-
mote any underlying policy of the McCarran Act, i.e., were the
boycott actions the kind the McCarran Act was designed to allow? 2u
Finally, was the boycott mandated, authorized or otherwise regu-
lated by state law?221 It is implicit that where the alleged boycott is
anti-competitive in purpose and effect, does not promote the objec-
tives of the McCarran Act and is not authorized by the state, the
conduct is subject to Sherman Act challenge.
Importantly, the Court qualified the fourth part of the analysis
by refusing to say whether state authorization (not present in the
facts of Barry) should be considered in determining whether the
alleged conduct falls within section 3(b) or whether it would form
the basis of a Parker "state action" defense. 2 6
Thus the Court never fully answered the very question on which
it granted certiorari, i.e., whether a boycott under section 3(b) of the
McCarran Act is the same as a boycott under section 1 of the Sher-
man Act. We are told implicitly that they are not necessarily the
222. "As a means of ensuring policyholder submission to new, restrictive ground rules of
coverage, St. Paul obtained the agreement of the other petitioners, strangers to the immediate
dispute, to refuse to sell any insurance to its policyholders." Id. at 2936.
223. "The argument binding petitioners erected a barrier between St. Paul's customers and
any alternative source of the desired coverage, effectively foreclosing all possibility of compe-
tition anywhere in the relevant market. . . . St. Paul's policyholders became the captives of
their insurer." Id.
224. "The conduct alleged here is certainly not, in Senator O'Mahoney's terms, within the
category of 'agreements which can normally be made in the insurance business,' . . . or
'agreements and combinations in the public interests [sic] which can safely be permitted.'
Id. (citations omitted).
225. "We emphasize that the conduct with which petitioners are charged appears to have
occurred outside of any regulatory or cooperative arrangement established by the laws of
Rhode Island. There was no state authorization of the conduct in question." Id.
226. The state-action doctrine would not seem to be applicable since Parker was a finding
by the Court that Congress had expressed no intention of applying the Sherman Act to
governmental acts of the state as sovereign. Clearly, in the McCarran Act, Congress expressed
such an intent. See note 141 supra.
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same, although they are at least very similar. In future cases these
differences may not be readily apparent; they should surface, how-
ever, when the allegations are subjected to the final substantive
analysis used by the Barry majority. The possible consequences of
state authorization remain a mystery, but it appears that the Court
would find some way of upholding boycott-type activity undertaken
pursuant to a state directive or plan.
The opinion, no doubt, strikes down the narrow view held by the
Fifth2 and Ninth1 Circuits. By narrowing the McCarran Act ex-
emption itself, clearly the recent trend of increased litigation in this
area will continue, if not accelerate. The decision also portends an
increase in competition among insurance companies, resulting, per-
haps, in newer forms of coverage and lower rates.
VI. ADDITIONAL ANTITRUST CASES: ANOTHER EXEMPTION AND
PROCEDURE.
Last term saw three other antitrust decisions, each involving the
interpretation of statutory provisions. None involved the complexity
found in other antitrust decisions, and thus they are treated here
together.
A. Round Three: Antitrust Laws-3 Exemptions-O.
For the third time last Term,"2 9 a defendant came to the Court
seeking an exemption from the antitrust laws and for the third time
the Court denied the exemption and re-emphasized the importance
of the antitrust laws and economic competition.3 ' National Broiler
Marketing Association (NBMA) v. United States,21 involved inter-
227. Meicler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 506 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1975). See text accompanying
note 203 supra.
228. Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 503 F.2d 725 (9th Cir.
1974). See text accompanying note 203 supra.
229. See Parts IV and V supra.
230. To repeat an oft used quote:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta
of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and
our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental
personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every business, no matter
how small, is the freedom to compete - to assert with vigor, imagination, devotion,
and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster.
United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
231. 98 S.Ct. 2122 (1978).
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pretation of a statutory exemption, the Capper-Volstead Act,232
which provides a limited exemption for agricultural producers and
farmers as well as for their agricultural cooperatives.
NBMA marks only the fifth time since the passage of the Capper-
Volstead Act in 1922 that the Supreme Court has examined the
exemption.m Lower federal courts have also been relatively inac-
tive. As the Fifth Circuit noted: "[N]o significant body of Capper-
Volstead law has developed in the lower federal courts. And the
legal commentary has not been abundant." ' 4 This lack of activity
may have led the Court to comment at the beginning of NBMA that
"[t]he issue apparently is of importance to the broiler industry and
in the administration of the antitrust laws. ' 'M5
The NBMA is a nonprofit cooperative association composed of
less than seventy-five members involved in the production and mar-
keting of broiler chickens. 23 1 At the time the Justice Department
brought suit, most of its members were fully integrated, i.e., en-
gaged in all three phases of the broiler production process: breeding
and hatching, growing, and processing. Three of its members, how-
ever, were only involved in the processing stage.
The civil action against NBMA alleged that it and its members
entered into price-fixing agreements in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. NBMA claimed that any such agreement was exempt
232. Cooperative Marketing Associations Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292 (1964). Section 1 pro-
vides in part:
Persons engaged in the production of agricultural products as farmers, planters,
ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers may act together in associations, corporate
or otherwise, with or without capital stock, in collectively processing, preparing for
market, handling, and marketing in interstate and foreign commerce, such products
of persons so engaged. Such associations may have marketing agencies in common; and
such associations and their members may make the necessary contracts and agree-
ments to effect such purposes. ...
233. Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384 (1967) (membership of non-
growers in cooperative results in loss of immunity); Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler &
Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S. 19 (1962) (three cooperatives may join together to form one
exempt entity); Maryland & Ma. Milk Producers Ass'n. v. United States, 362 U.S. 458
(1960) (predatory practices by a cooperative not exempt); United States v. Borden Co., 308
U.S. 188 (1939)(a cooperative may be guilty of antitrust violations when combining with
outside, non-exempt parties).
234. United States v. NBMA, 650 F.2d 1380, 1384 (5th Cir. 1977) (footnotes omitted). For
a partial listing of lower court cases and commentary, see id. nn.10 & 11.
235. 98 S.Ct. at 2125 (emphasis added).
236. Id. at 2126.
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from challenge under the Capper-Volstead Act, and the district
court agreed.27 Based on an earlier decision, Case-Swayne Co. v.
Sunkist Growers,25 and the fact that three NBMA members were
only processors, the Fifth Circuit reversed.2 19
The entire case hinged on the definition of "producer" and
"farmer" as those terms are used in the Capper-Volstead Act.
NBMA argued, however, not what the definition was but what it
should be was the issue. Citing the drastic changes in the basic
structure and characteristics of the agricultural industry since 1922,
it urged an expansion of the exemption to cover all persons engaged
in agriculture who take the risk of uncertain prices rather than
simply those persons engaged in the initial stages of growing and
producing or who only "till the soil. ' '24
Justice Blackmun wrote the brief opinion for the majority. Ac-
cording to the Court's reading of the legislative history, the Act was
designed to protect the small, independent farmer who, when taking
his perishable crop to market, found himself at a distinct competi-
tive disadvantage to brokers and middlemen. By allowing these
farmers to form cooperatives to pack, ship and sell the produce, the
middlemen could be avoided and the competitive balance equal-
ized. Clearly the Act was not designed to protect those same middle-
men when they joined the farmer in formation of a cooperative.
Once the cooperative allowed members who were only packers/
processors, the immunity was lost.
As in Barry,4' however, the most interesting question was raised,
but specifically left open:2 2 Is immunity lost when middlemen, i.e.,
packers/processors, also own, to some degree, the means of produc-
tion, i.e., the land, cattle or chickens, and thus are vertically
integrated? Because NBMA had members who engaged only in pro-
237. United States v. National Boiler Mkting. Ass'n, [1975-2] TRADE REG. RE'. (CCH)
60,509 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
238. As noted earlier, note 228 supra, Case-Swayne held that to be exempt a cooperative
must be composed only of producers. The issue in NBMA seems so similar and the Court's
holding so narrow that one wonders why certiorari was even granted.
239. 550 F.2d 1380 (5th Cir. 1977).
240. Brief for Petitioner at 16, 21, National Broiler Mkting. Ass'n v. United States, 98 S.Ct.
2122 (1978).
241. See note 221 supra and accompanying text.
242. 98 S.Ct. at 2130 n.21.
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cessing, which caused its loss of immunity, it was not necessary for
the Court to determine whether integration backwards into produc-
tion would save the exemption.
Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, answered this ques-
tion, positing that the fully integrated producers also cause loss of
immunity for cooperatives of which they are members. He inter-
preted the Act and its legislative history as providing an exemption
only to farmers who need to cooperate in processing and marketing
their crops. Congress intended no exemption for fully integrated
agri-businesses which cooperate principally to set prices and allo-
cate markets.23
Justice White's dissent argued that expansion of the exemption's
scope was necessary because of drastic changes in agriculture since
passage of the Capper-Volstead Act. The small, independent farmer
has become a rarity.2" Justice Brennan countered this argument by
noting that where an exemption is antiquated, as here, any recon-
struction or revitalization must be done by Congress. 245
Whether any of the other Justices subscribe to Justice Brennan's
view of the scope of the exemption is unclear. Although a majority
in NBMA was not ready to support him, adoption of Justice Bren-
nan's result in the near future is not unlikely should the Court be
presented with the issue in an unavoidable posture. This Court,
although prone to avoid issues when possible, has been very consis-
tent in their narrow reading of exemptions.
B. Tolling the Statute of Limitations: Greyhound.
Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc.,26 arose out of a bitter
conflict between two competitors dating back to 1947. The plaintiff,
Mt. Hood, operated a small, regional bus service in the northwest
corner of the country. From 1947 to 1956, Greyhound, through sys-
tematic acquisition,17 completely surrounded Mt. Hood's area of
operation, placing Mt. Hood in the unenviable position of depend-
ence upon its giant competitor for all through traffic, both passenger
243. 98 S.Ct. at 2135 (Brennan, J., concurring).
244. See 98 S.Ct. at 2136 (White, J., dissenting).
245. 98 S.Ct. at 2136 (Brennan, J., concurring).
246. 98 S.Ct. 2370 (1978).
247. Greyhound purchased eight regional bus companies in this time period. Id. at 2372.
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and freight. In hearings before the ICC, Greyhound promised to
continue all through routes. It later cancelled the routes and, in
1964, Mt. Hood filed a complaint before the ICC.1s The Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department intervened in the proceedings to
ask that the ICC give Mt. Hood the opportunity to prove its allega-
tions. In 1968, Mt. Hood filed an antitrust suit, alleging violations
of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and claiming damages from
1947.451 The jury returned a special verdict for Mt. Hood which
would have resulted in a recovery of $13,000,000 after trebling but
for the finding that Mt. Hood knew or should have known of Grey-
hound's violations in 1960. With the statute of limitations being four
years,50 Mt. Hood's damages could only go back to 1964. Mt. Hood's
claim though, and the only issue before the Supreme Court, was
that the intervention of the Antitrust Division resulted in the limi-
tations period reverting back to 1964 under section 5(i) of the Clay-
ton Act" ' which tolls the limitation period during antitrust proceed-
ings initiated by the Government.
Both lower courts upheld Mt. Hood's claim,"' basing their deci-
sions not on the literal wording of section 5(i), but on a congressional
purpose to allow private suits whenever possible after any antitrust
involvement by the government. This purpose would be advanced
by "treating intervention by Antitrust Division lawyers as the func-
tional equivalent of a direct action by them."' ' 5
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected this clear expansion of
the statutory language. The Court began its analysis by noting that
248. Greyhound later refused to reinstate the through routes in contravention of a formal
ICC order and a district court injunction. Finally, upon a finding of criminal contempt
against Greyhound, civil contempt against several of its officers, and fines totalling $600,000,
Greyhound reinstituted the through-bus arrangement that it had originally promised to
maintain with Mt. Hood. Id. at 2374.
249. The complaint alleged numerous restraints of trade, predatory praLctices, monopoliza-
tion and attempts to monopolize through the acquisition of surrounding bus lines and which
deprived Mt. Hood of connecting traffic. See Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555
F.2d 687, 689 (9th Cir. 1977).
250. The Sherman Act's statute of limitations is contained in section 4(B) of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1976).
251. 15 U.S.C. § 16(i) (1976) provides in part that "[w]henever any civil or criminal
proceeding is instituted by the United States to. . .punish violations of any of the antitrust
laws . . . the running of the statute of limitations . . . shall be suspended during the pen-
dency thereof and for one year thereafter."
252. 555 F.2d 687, 699 (9th Cir. 1977).
253. 555 F.2d at 700.
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"[lthe starting point in every case involving construction of a stat-
ute is the language itself."' 4 For tolling, the statute requires that
the government institute a civil or criminal proceeding; here, how-
ever, the government simply intervened in a proceeding already
instituted by Mt. Hood. Further, the petition to intervene made no
allegations of any antitrust violations and took no position on the
merits of Mt. Hood's position that Greyhound was attempting to
monopolize the market. The Justice Department simply asked the
Commission to give Mt. Hood the opportunity to prove its claims. 255
The Court did not go so far as to say that intervention by the
government in a regulatory proceeding would never toll the statute.
Rather, once again,25 it simply left the question open. 257 The Court
also found no help for Mt. Hood in the legislative history of section
5(i). Congress wanted private parties to be able to use facts estab-
lished by the government in antitrust proceedings. 258 Here, the Jus-
tice Department put forth no facts, examined no witnesses and did
not attempt to prove anything.
The Court had no choice but to decide against Mt. Hood. The
Ninth Circuit had clearly expanded the scope of section 5(i); and,
it appeared that Mt. Hood would obtain only its post-1964 treble
damages in spite of Greyhound's blatantly predatory actions. In
addition to its section 5(i) claim, however, Mt. Hood had argued
that the statute of limitation should be tolled on equitable
grounds;" 9 because certiorari had not been granted on that question,
the Court dutifully declined to decide the issue, leaving it for the
254. 98 S.Ct. at 2375 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756
(1975)(Powell, J., concurring)); see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 98 S.Ct.
2923 (1978); Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing).
255. 98 S.Ct. at 2376. This lack of position on the part of the Justice Department served
to distinguish this case from Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Furnishing
Co., 381 U.S. 311 (1965). There the Court held that the statute of limitations was tolled by
an FTC proceeding which successfully challenged a merger which also was the subject of the
private action.
256. See notes 221 & 236 supra and accompanying text.
257. 98 S.Ct. at 2378 n.20.
258. Id. at 2377.
259. Brief for Respondent 22-32, 98 S.Ct. 2370 (1978). Simply stated, Mt. Hood's argument
was that tolling is an equitable doctrine that may be applied to prevent injustice, and that
application was proper here because, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, Mt. Hood
had to go before the ICC before it could bring an action in federal court.
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Ninth Circuit on remand."'0 Chief Justice Burger, however, made
clear that should Mt. Hood's equitable argument be upheld on re-
mand, the circuit court need not fear another reversal. His concurr-
ence was brief but impassioned in stressing the magnitude of Grey-
hound's repeated violations."8 ' While carefully not deciding whether
equitable principles tolled the statute of limitations, he assured the
court of appeals that it was free to consider the question and he even
pointed the court to all the authority it would need to do so. 62
Greyhound will take little joy in having won this battle, for, in the
process, the Chief Justice seems to have cost it the war.
C. Standing for Foreign Governments: Pfizer
Chas. Pfizer & Co., American Cyanamid and, to a lesser extent,
four other pharmaceutical manufacturing companies have been the
subject of a multitude of antitrust suits charging price-fixing, mar-
ket allocation and monopolization of broad spectrum antibiotics."3
When foreign governments jumped on the bandwagon, the Supreme
Court was asked to determine for the first time whether foreign
nations are "persons" under the Sherman and Clayton Acts " and
thus entitled to sue for treble damages. In a five to three decision,8 '
the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of two lower courts2 8 and
granted standing.
As in Greyhound, the question in Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of
India involved statutory interpretation. 7 The Court admitted that
260. 98 S.Ct. at 2379 n.21.
261. 98 S.Ct. at 2379 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
262. Id. The Chief Justice stated as follows:
The authority of a federal court, sitting as a chancellor, to toll a statute of limitations
on equitable grounds is a well established part of our jurisprudence. . . . With respect
to the limitations period of the Clayton Act, equitable tolling is particularly appropri-
ate since the addition of a federal limitations period in the Act was essentially a
"procedural" change in the statute.
263. Pfizer has been sued by the FTC, the Justice Department, its competitors, its custom-
ers, and over fifty state and local governments. Several have sued more than once.
264. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7, 12 (1976): "The word 'person,' or 'persons,' [wherever used in this
act] shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized
by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any
State, or the laws of any foreign country."
265. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978) Burger, C.J., Powell and
Rehnquist, J.J., dissented. Justice Blackmun took no part in the decision.
266. 550 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1976). The district court decision is unreported.
267. See note 246 supra and accompanying text.
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"[t]here is no statutory provision or legislative history that pro-
vides a clear answer; it seems apparent that the question was never
considered at the time the Sherman and Clayton Acts were en-
acted. ' 268 There were, according to the Court, two reasons why the
plaintiffs might not be "persons": First, they were foreign; and sec-
ond, they were sovereign nations. On the first issue, the Court noted
that the definition of "person" contained in the antitrust laws29
specifically includes foreign corporations and thus allows the as-
sumption that an entity should not be denied standing simply be-
cause it is foreign. Further, allowing foreign plaintiffs standing
serves the two purposes of private antitrust actions, deterrence and
compensation.270
The Court relied on an earlier decision to answer the second ques-
tion, viz., whether sovereignty precluded standing. In Georgia v.
Evans, 27' the Court held that a sovereign state is a "person" and
thus has standing. The majority in Pfizer reasoned that foreign
nations could be victims of antitrust violations as much as domestic
states.272 Noting that foreign governments are generally entitled to
bring suits in federal courts,2 3 the Court held that an exception to
this rule for antitrust could not be justified without affirmative
legislative intent.24
The dissent, while recognizing the lack of pertinent legislative
history, used this as its springboard to reach an opposite conclusion.
While the majority held that standing should be conferred absent
clear legislative intent, the dissent argued that there should be no
standing without an affirmative legislative intent.25
Presently, there is a movement in Congress to limit the Pfizer
holding by legislation providing for standing only in limited circum-
stances.2 76 Because, however, this provision is a rider to a bill which
268. 434 U.S. at 316 (footnote omitted).
269. 15 U.S.C. § 7, 12 (1976). See note 259 supra.
270. 434 U.S. at 131-14.
271. 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
272. 434 U.S. at 318.
273. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)(4) (Supp. 1978).
274. 434 U.S. at 319.
275. "The conversion of this silence in 1890 into an affirmative intent in 1978 is indeed
startling." 434 U.S. at 325 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
276. At the time of this writing, the Antitrust Enforcement Act of 1978 (S. 1874) had
cleared the Senate Judiciary Committee. The bill contains a section partially overruling
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would overrule the Court's 1977 decision in Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois,2"1 which precluded indirect purchases from antitrust recov-
eries, one question is whether the Pfizer amendment will be fully
debated. Whatever Congress does, the Court's decision is another
indication of the importance it places on vigorous enforcement and
the broad scope of the antitrust laws.
VII. NON-ANTITRUST CASES AFFECTING COMPETITION
The Court's antitrust decisions exhibit a hospitable attitude to-
ward the policy of economic competition. We now turn to cases
which, although not raising strictly antitrust issues, involved the
antitrust laws peripherally or otherwise will affect the level of com-
petition.
A. The Home Court Advantage Is Worth More Than Ten Points:
Exxon Corp. v. Maryland
Economic competition suffered its worst setback of the Term in
Exxon Corp. v. Maryland,275 where the Court upheld a Maryland
statute which (1) forbids producers and refiners of petroleum prod-
ucts from operating retail gasoline stations in Maryland,2" and (2)
requires that a "voluntary allowance"2 1  extended to one dealer by
a supplier be extended to all dealers in the state."' The first provi-
sion, a so-called "gasoline divestiture" statute, was alleged to vio-
late the due process and commerce clauses. The second was alleged
to conflict with section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act,2 2 and
therefore with the supremacy clause. 2 3
Pfizer, by allowing foreign nations to sue for actual damages upon a finding by a court that
the plaintiff nation has enacted its own laws prohibiting restrictive trade practices and allows
suit in its courts by the United States. See 870 ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-1
(June 29, 1978).
277. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
278. 98 S.Ct. 2207 (1978).
279. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157E(c) (Supp. 1977).
280. A voluntary allowance is a reduction in price or a discount given by the oil company
to its dealers for a short period to allow the dealer to compete with other retailers.
281. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157E(d) (Supp. 1977).
282. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1970). See note 30 supra.
283. U.S. CONST. art. VI. The plaintiffs were Exxon, Continental, Shell, Gulf, Ashland and
Phillips Petroleum all of.which are fully integrated, i.e., perform production, refining, trans-
portation and marketing functions; and Commonwealth Oil, a refiner which does not produce
oil but purchases it from other companies. Continental, Commonwealth and Ashland had
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The legislature's precise rationale for enacting the divestiture por-
tion of the statute is not clear. Both the Supreme Court and the
Maryland Court of Appeals emphasized a study done by the Mary-
land Comptroller which showed that stations owned by independent
dealers received less gasoline during the 1973 gas shortage than did
stations operated by the oil companies. The court of appeals also
noted that since evidence showed that the companies were convert-
ing independent dealer stations to company owned outlets, the leg-
islature "could reasonably conclude," that this trend was anticom-
petitive .1 4
The rationale for requiring oil companies to give every dealer in
the state a discount if any dealer were given one is even less clear.
The court of appeals simply noted that the practice was a means of
controlling price competition in localized areas.28 5 The Supreme
Court appeared to rationalize the provision on the ground that
Maryland chose the policy of treating all customers equally over
that of allowing sellers freedom to make their own competitive deci-
sions.2ss
The Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the statute against all
challenges. 8 With respect to the due process challenge, it noted
that the test was not the wisdom of the measure, but whether there
were "any considerations relating to the public welfare by which it
can be supported," or whether it was unreasonable, arbitrary or
only company-owned retail outlets in Maryland and marketed large volumes of gasoline at
prices consistently lower than other retailers. The remaining plaintiffs sold primarily to their
franchised, independent retail dealers who resold to the public, although each had at least
one company-owned retail outlet.
The case was commenced in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Maryland. In
addition to commerce clause, substantive due process, and preemption by Robinson-Patman
challenges, the plaintiffs argued that the statute resulted in an unconstitutional taking of
property and denied them equal protection of the laws. They also argued that it constituted
an unlawful delegation of legislative power by authorizing Maryland's Comptroller to promul-
gate certain regulations, was preempted by the Federal Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act,
and was void for vagueness. These theories were not pursued to the Supreme Court.
284. Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 370 A.2d 1102, 1112 (1977).
285. 279 Md. at 446, 370 A.2d at 1122.
286. 98 S.Ct. at 2217-18.
287. Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 370 A.2d 1102 (1977). The lower state court
had invalidated the voluntary allowance portion of the statute because it would preclude
suppliers from discriminating in price where section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act would
allow it, see 1976-1 TRAnE CASES (CCH) 60,704 (Cir. Ct. Anne Arundel County, Md. 1975),
and the divestiture portion on substantive due process grounds.
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oppressive.288 Holding, in effect, that the plaintiffs failed to 'show
that the statute would not promote competition, the court overruled
this challenge. 2s9
The plaintiffs fared no better with their commerce clause theory.
The court of appeals held: (1) that the flow of gasoline into Mary-
land would not be burdened since the statute regulated a wholly
intrastate activity, viz., retailing; (2) that the purpose of the statute
was to promote competition rather than protect local retailers as the
oil companies argued; and (3) that commerce was not discriminated
against because neither intrastate producers or refiners (of which
there were none) nor interstate producers or refiners could operate
retail outlets.
With respect to the requirement that any discount given to one
customer be given to all, the companies argued that section 2(b) of
the Robinson-Patman Act, the "meeting competition" defense,
gave them a right to discriminate where the discount was given a
customer to allow him to compete with a competitor who had re-
ceived a discount from his supplier. The court held, however, that
since section 2(b) did not even apply to this situation, there was no
conflict. 9 '
288. 279 Md. at 424, 370 A.2d at 1110-11, (quoting Westchester West No. 2 v. Montgomery
County, 276 Md. 448, 455, 348 A.2d 856, 860 (1975)).
289. The plaintiff oil companies argued that if the statute was upheld, competition would
be reduced because refining companies operating outlets solely with company personnel as
well as other aggressive, independent marketers depending on high volume sales at low prices
would cease competing in Maryland and new competitors would eschew the Maryland mar-
ket. The state, on the other hand, argued that without the divestiture statute, competition
would decrease because recent increases in crude oil prices would allow the integrated compa-
nies to use profits achieved there to drive competitors in retailing from the market and divert
gasoline supplies from independent, unbranded retailers. Finally, the state argued that the
companies' desire to convert more stations to company-owned status would reduce the num-
ber of competitors.
290. In FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963), the Court held that the meeting competi-
tion defense was not available where a seller reduced his price to one customer to allow that
customer to compete against a competitor who had not received a price cut from his supplier.
Whether the defense would have been available had the competing retailer been given help
by his supplier was specifically left open. Lower courts have reached diverse results. Compare
Bargain Car Wash, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 466 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1972)(§ 2(b) defense
available), with Enterprise Indus. v. Texas Co., 136 F. Supp. 420 (D. Conn. 1955), reu'd on
other grounds, 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957) (defense not available).
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The Supreme Court affirmed.2"' All Justices hearing the case292
agreed that substantive due process standards were not violated and
that the voluntary allowance provision did not conflict sufficiently
with the Robinson-Patman Act or any other antitrust policy to war-
rant preemption. All except one agreed with the Maryland Court of
Appeals that the divestiture provision did not offend the commerce
clause.
Finding that the statute bore "a reasonable relation to the State's
legitimate purpose in controlling the gasoline retail market, '293 the
Court rejected the due process claim.2s4 With respect to the com-
merce clause, the Court adopted much of the Maryland court's
reasoning. It rejected the argument that the divestiture provision
effectively would discriminate against out-of-state companies, hold-
ing, rather, that only companies performing certain functions, i.e.,
producing and refining, whether in Maryland or not, were ex-
cluded.295 Additionally, the Court held that there was no burden on
commerce because while some refiners might cease their retail oper-
ations and thus ship less gas into Maryland, other refiners would fill
this void.298 The Court felt that the plaintiffs' real concern was not
that interstate commerce would be affected, but that they would be
excluded from the retail market. To that, it retorted that the com-
merce clause protects interstate markets rather than interstate
firms.
29 7
Mr. Justice Blackmun dissented, arguing that because the practi-
cal effect of the statute was to exclude out-of-state gasoline marke-
ters, the statute was invalid 218 unless the state carried the burden
of showing that the provision supported some legitimate state inter-
est which could not be achieved by a less drastic measure. And while
291. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 98 S.Ct. 2207 (1978).
292. Mr. Justice Powell took no part in the case.
293. 98 S.Ct. at 2213.
294. The Court noted that the efficacy of the statute in promoting competition was far from
clear: "The evidence presented by the refiners may cast some doubt on the wisdom of the
statute, but it is, by now, absolutely clear that the Due Process Clause does not empower
the judiciary 'to sit as a "superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation .... Id. (Citations
omitted).
295. Id. at 2213-14.
296. Id. at 2214.
297. Id. at 2215.
298. 98 S.Ct. at 2219 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the state's purported goal was to promote competition, it had not
even attempted to demonstrate why it was necessary to ban com-
pletely the out-of-state producer-refiners."'s
Implicit throughout Mr. Justice Blackmun's opinion was the be-
lief that the divestiture provision was special interest legislation
enacted specifically to protect small, local businessmen. Twice, he
referred to the statute's "parochialism,"' 0 and noted that, perhaps,
the out-of-state plaintiffs had insufficient political clout, when com-
pared with the in-state dealers, to stop the measure. 01
The voluntary allowance provision was also upheld. All Justices
agreed that there was insufficient conflict between it and the
Robinson-Patman Act to warrant preemption, even if the section
2(b) defense were available where the supplier lowered his price to
allow a customer to compete with a retailer who had received a price
reduction from his supplier. 02 Noting that the companies' major
argument was that the Maryland statute-prohibited discrimination
where the Robinson-Patman Act might permit it,13° the Court sim-
ply said that any possible conflict was too speculative to warrant
preemption. To the argument that the statute undermined the com-
petitive balance that Congress intended between the Sherman and
Robinson-Patman Acts,34 the Court said that this was just another
299. Id. at 2221.
300. 98 S.Ct. at 2222, 2227. Cf. City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 98 S.Ct. 1123,
1134 (1978)(footnote omitted): "If municipalities were free to make economic choices coun-
seled solely by their own parochial interests and without regard to their anticompetitive
effects, a serious chink in the armor of antitrust protection would be introduced at odds with
the comprehensive national policy Congress established."
301. See Note, Gasoline Marketing Divestiture Statutes: A Preliminary Constitutional and
Economic Assessment, 28 VAND. L. REv. 1277, 1307 (1975), where the author says:
Although neutral on their face, the statutes will unquestionably have the effect of
shielding local gasoline dealers from the competition of major oil producers engaged
in interstate commerce. Whatever the enacting states' asserted interest in insuring
motorist-consumers an uninterrupted supply of reasonably priced petroleum products,
the independent dealers' lobbyist groups have supplied the primary impetus for the
enactment of the divestiture statutes.
302. Whether the defense was available in such a situation was not decided. See 98 S.Ct.
at 2216.
303. For example, if the suppliers cut the price in Baltimore to allow its dealer to meet a
competitive situation there, the price also would have to be cut to dealers in Maryland near
the border who compete with dealers across the state line. To avoid a section 2(a) secondry
line violation, the seller must also offer the out-of-state customer the voluntary allowance.
304. It is often argued that because the Robinson-Patman Act precludes price differences,
its effect is to stabilize prices, thus undercutting the Sherman Act's policy of maximizing
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argument that the statute was anti-competitive," 5 and, by itself, an
insufficient reason for invalidation.3 6
From the standpoint of economic competition, the disturbing as-
pect of Exxon is not the Court's analysis or even its result, which
may have been mandated under the constitutional provisions in
question. Rather, the case is disturbing because it means that states
can enact and sustain all sorts of anti-competitive regulation. In-
deed, Exxon will give impetus to other state legislatures to enact
similar types of statutes dealing with the retail marketing of gaso-
line as well as other industries. For example, the Court noted that
four states had adopted similar statutes and that thirty-two others
had considered such legislation. 07 Similar types of statutes which,
for example, restrict a seller from franchising more than one dealer
in an area, are prevalent in the automotiveso and beer industries, 39
and much of the Court's analysis in Exxon will apply to attacks on
them.3 10 Thus, state legislatures may find themselves besieged with
local businessmen from a multitude of industries, asking for special
protection from large national concerns. This can only inure to the
detriment of consumers.
The arguments are always the same: The large firm acts in a
predatory manner. If'it operates in more than one geographic mar-
ket, it subsidizes losses in one market with high profits in another;
if it is a conglomerate, it subsidizes losses on one product from
price competition. See generally UNTrED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr (1977).
305. The Court recognized that "[i]n this sense, there is a conflict between the statute
and the central policy of the Sherman Act - our 'charter of economic liberty.' " 98 S.Ct. at
2218.
306. The Court concluded that "if an adverse effect on competition were, in and of itself,
enough to render a state statute invalid, the States' power to engage in economic regulation
would be effectively destroyed." Id.
307. 98 S.Ct. at 2215 n.18. The General Assembly of Virginia enacted its version of a
petroleum divestiture provision during its last session. See VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-21.16:1
(Cum. Supp. 1978). The Wall Street Journal, June 15, 1978, noted that the Chamber of
Commerce estimates that at least seventeen other industries may attempt similar legislation.
308. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-547 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
309. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 4-118.6 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
310. In American Motor Sales Corp. v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 445 F. Supp. 902 (E.D.
Va. 1978), Virginia's statute prohibiting automobile manufacturers from establishing more
than one dealership in a defined trade area except under certain circumstances was declared
unconstitutional under the commerce clause. The case, decided before Exxon, is on appeal
and probably will be reversed.
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excess profits on others; if it is vertically integrated, it subsidizes
downstream losses with upstream profits. Unfortunately, the var-
ious legislatures often give too much credence to these arguments,
especially when put forward by strong, well-organized trade associa-
tions, and forget that often efficiency is equated with predatory
abuse.
In some instances, but probably very few, these arguments have
some validity:
This state of affairs in the petroleum industry poses a dilemma to
the thoughtful legislator considering proposed divestiture legislation.
On the one hand, the efficiencies made possible through the oil ma-
jors' large scale, integrated methods of operation enable them to pass
on potentially significant cost savings to the consumer. On the other
hand, the majors, under certain circumstances at least, appear to be
capable of destroying needed competition at the marketing level.'"
But it makes little sense to throw the baby out with the bathwater
as Maryland did. 2 As Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent, less
restrictive alternatives were available-alternatives which would
solve the problems envisioned by the legislature, while, at the same
time, allow consumers to benefit from the advantages flowing from
efficiencies. Especially difficult to understand was Maryland's pre-
clusion of companies which had never used independent dealers
and, themselves, were dependent on the majors for oil to refine.
Two elementary principles of antitrust analysis are that the anti-
trust laws are meant to protect competition rather than competi-
tors," 3 and that exclusion of competitors is disfavored.314 These prin-
ciples are equally valid policies in other contexts and should be
heeded by legislators when they contemplate regulatory schemes
which limit market entry and establish quasi-public utilities in in-
311. Note, Gasoline Marketing Divestiture Statutes: A Preliminary Constitutional and
Economic Assessment, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1277, 1319 (1975).
312. In what appears to be another boon to independent dealers, a district court recently
upheld another Maryland statute which places a two year moratorium on allowing retail
stations to change from full-service facilities to gas only outlets. The purported state interest
for the statute was motorist safety. Sun Oil Co. v. Goldstein, No. N-77-1960 (D. Md. June
23, 1978).
313. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
314. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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dustries which exhibit few of the economic characteristics of natural
monopolies.
B. Solicitation of Business and the First Amendment: Ohralik and
Primus
Ever since the Court made clear in Bigelow v. Virginia"5 that
commercial speech, i.e., speech calculated to result in a commercial
transaction, is entitled to some protection under the first amend-
ment, the Court has wrestled with state prohibitions of certain types
of solicitation. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,3"' a statute prohibiting drug price
advertising by pharmacists was invalidated. And in the 1976 Term,
the Court declared that attorneys have a first amendment right to
publish truthful advertising concerning the terms and availability
of routine legal services in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona."1 7
The nexus between truthful advertising, especially price advertis-
ing, and economic competition is clear; the economist's model of
economic competition assumes a state of perfect knowledge.31 1 In-
deed, that price advertising often decreases price contributed to the
Court's result in Pharmacy and Bates.39
Advertising such as that permitted by Bates, of course, is only one
form of business solicitation. Specifically left open by that decision
was whether "in-person solicitation of clients - at the hospital
315. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
316. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
317. 433 U.S. 350 (1977); see also Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977), which
invalidated a local ordinance prohibiting the placing of real estate "for sale" signs in yards.
318. See, e.g., C. FERGUSON, MICROECONOwc THEORY 224 (1969).
319. In Bates, for example, 433 U.S. at 377, the Court noted that "where consumers have
the benefit of price advertising, retail prices often are dramatically lower than they would be
without advertising."
In Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765, the Court explained how price competition improves alloca-
tive efficiency:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless
dissemination of information as to who is producing and selling what product, for what
reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise
economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through numer-
ous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions,
in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commer-
cial information is indispensable.
320. 433 U.S. at 366.
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room or the accident site, or in any other situation that breeds
undue influence," 2 ' is constitutionally protected. 31' To the surprise
of no one, this question was soon before the Court. Unfortunately,
however, the factual circumstances in which it arose were so egre-
gious in one case and so innocuous in the other that the Court was
not required to espouse clear standards which will provide the var-
ious state bars with guidance.
The constitutionality of state prohibitions on solicitations by at-
torneys arose in the companion cases of Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Association322 and In re Primus.323 While both cases involved aspects
of solicitation arguably prohibited by Disciplinary Rule 2-103 of the
states' Code of Professional Responsibility and were decided to-
gether, all similarity ends there.
In Ohralik, the attorney learned of an automobile accident, vis-
ited the victim in the hospital, and there solicited her business. In
addition, he solicited the business of the victim's rider while surrep-
titiously taping their conversations. When both clients finally fired
him, he sued for breach of contract. The Supreme Court of Ohio
rejected his argument that such conduct was protected by the first
amendment as a form of commercial speech and suspended him
indefinitely from the practice of law.3 4
Mr. Justice Powell, speaking for a unanimous Court, 325 first made
clear that commercial speech enjoys a somewhat lower degree of
first amendment protection than do some other forms of speech.
Accordingly, it may be subjected to regulation which would not be
tolerated in other contexts. Moreover, because speech is only a sub-
ordinate part of in-person solicitation, it demands a lower level of
judicial scrutiny than otherwise would be the case. 28
Advertising of the type presented in Bates was differentiated on
the grounds that it left the recipient free to act or not and did not
require an immediate response without leaving time to contemplate
321. Also left open was whether advertising the quality of legal services could be prohib-
ited. Id. at 383.
322. 98 S.Ct. 1912 (1978).
323. 98 S.Ct. 1893 (1978).
324. Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Ohralik, 48 Ohio St. 2d 217, 357 N.E.2d 1097 (1976).
325. Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the case.
326. 98 S.Ct. at 1918-19.
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alternatives. On the other hand, in-person solicitation was often
one-sided and provided no opportunity for other points of view.
Emphasis was placed on the consumers' need for information upon
which to make rational choices rather than the attorney's interest
in "procurement of remunerative employment . . a subject only
marginally affected with First Amendment concerns." 32
After noting that regulation of speech often is permissible where '
necessary to achieve a legitimate state interest, the Court explained
that the state interests which the prohibition of in-person solicita-
tion promoted were consumer protection and the maintenance of
"true professionalism, 3 28 i.e., the protection of clients. To the ex-
tent, then, that the prohibition protects the public from evils of
solicitation such as overreaching, invasion of privacy, and conflict
of interest between the lawyer's judgment and his own economic
betterment, it promotes a legitimate state interest and is valid.
Importantly, however, the Court did not approve all prohibitions
of in-person solicitation. Rather, it required that the facts of each
situation be examined. In rejecting the attorney's argument that
actual harm to the client must be shown, the Court held that the
prohibition may be applied where employment for pecuniary gain
occurs "under circumstances likely to result in adverse conse-
quences," such as situations "inherently conducive to overreach-
ing. ' 329 Particularly suspect is in-person solicitation of the
"unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay person. ' 30
The Court's refusal to require a showing of actual harm appeared
to be based on three factors. First, the prohibition is prophylactic
in nature, intending to prevent harm before it occurs.3 Second,
given the prophylactic nature of the rule, a showing of actual harm
would place too great a burden on the state. 32 Third, practical prob-
lems of policing and proof would arise.33 Unlike the type of written
advertising involved in Bates, in-person solicitation is oral, and thus
it is difficult later to ascertain what was said and the circumstances
327. 98 S.Ct. at 1920.
328. Id. at 1921 (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368 (1977)).
329. Id. at 1923.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 1924.
333. Id.
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surrounding the solicitation. 3 ' Accordingly, the Court was willing to
give the bar more leeway in prohibiting in-person solicitation than
in precluding other forms of advertising.
Primus33 presented a startling factual contrast.3 : There, the at-
torney, who was a cooperating lawyer with the American Civil Lib-
erties Union but received no money from it, wrote a letter to a
woman who had been sterilized, suggesting that she allow the ACLU
to file a civil rights suit on her behalf. The Supreme Court of South
Carolina held that the attorney had violated Disciplinary Rule 2-
103(D) and ordered a public reprimand.337
Unlike Ohralik, Primus argued not that her solicitation was pro-
tected commercial speech but that "her activity involved constitu-
tionally protected [political] expression and association. ' 3 1 Pri-
mary reliance was placed on NAACP v. Button,- 3 in which the
Court had held that the NAACP's efforts to solicit plaintiffs for civil
rights actions challenging racial discrimination were means of ex-
pression and association to advance political beliefi3, and thus con-
stitutionally protected.
The Court had little difficulty in quickly distinguishing Primus
from Ohralik. First, in-person solicitation was not even involved
because the solicitation was by letter.3 14 This distinction was not a
form over substance difference because use of a letter negated many
of the objections to in-person solicitation found in Ohralik. For ex-
ample, there is no coercion or overreaching and only a small inva-
334. Id.
335. 98 S.Ct. 1893.
336. As Mr. Justice Marshall noted in his concurrence in Ohralik, "[w]hile both of these
cases involve application of rules prohibiting attorneys from soliciting business, they could
hardly have arisen in more disparate factual settings." 98 S.Ct. at 1925 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring in part).
337. In re Smith, 268 S.C. 259, 233 S.E.2d 301 (1977).
338. 98 S.Ct. at 1899. Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, phrased the question
presented as follows:
[W] hether a State may punish a member of its Bar who, seeking to further political
and ideological goals through associational activity, including litigation, advises a lay
person of her legal rights and discloses in a subsequent letter that free legal assistance
is available from a nonprofit organization with which the lawyer and her associates are
affiliated.
Id. at 1896.
339. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
340. 98 S.Ct. at 1899.
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sion of privacy, because the recipient simply may throw the letter
away.34' In addition, tangible evidence of the solicitation is created
which is subject to subsequent examination.3 2 Second, no economic
benefits accrued to the attorney; her motive was not financial gain
but rather furtherance of her political beliefs. 3 3 Finally, speech cal-
culated to advance political ideology was involved rather than com-
mercial speech, and thus stricter scrutiny of the restraint was neces-
sary.3 44
Similar to its result in Ohralik that not all commercial speech in
the form of in-person solicitation can be prohibited, the Court held
in Primus that not all solicitation promoting political ideology or
objectives is protected. Rather, it adopted the standard rejected in
Ohralik that the state must show actual harm. 345 Then, as it did in
Ohralik, the Court examined the record below but determined that
none of the harms of solicitation had occurred. 5
Thus, Primus and Ohralik involved different facts and different
legal theories. Ohralik was a commercial speech case involving in-
person solicitation, while Primus involved a more protected form of
speech which arose outside the context of in-person solicitation.
Both cases, however, shed light on the permissible scope of in-
person solicitation prohibitions. Read together, they appear to es-
pouse two general rules. First, no written solicitation per se, whether
motivated by pecuniary gain or not, may be suppressed unless it
falls within one of the exceptions set forth in Bates.3 7 Second,
341. Id. at 1906-07.
342. Id. at 1907.
343. Id. at 1903.
344. Id. at 1906. Mr. Justice Powell noted that "[w]here political expression or association
is at issue, this Court has not tolerated the degree of imprecision that often characterizes
government regulation of the conduct of commercial affairs." Id.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist objected to the dichotomy between "commercial" and
"associational" speech, saying cynically that "we may be sure that the next lawyer in Ohra-
lik's shoes who is disciplined for similar conduct will come here cloaked in the prescribed
mantle of 'political association' to assure that insurance companies do not take unfair advan-
tage of policyholders." 98 S.Ct. 1910 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
345. "Although a showing of potential danger may suffice in the [context of commercial
speech], appellant may not be disciplined unless her activity in fact involved the type of
misconduct at which South Carolina's broad prohibition is said to be directed." 98 S.Ct. at
1906.
346. Id. at 1906-07.
347. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Bates held that a state may suppress
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whether written, oral, in-person, or otherwise, what Mr. Justice
Marshall referred to as "benign commercial solicitation,""34 is pro-
tected.
The crucial variable is the situation in which the solicitation oc-
curred. This, of course, injects considerations of the client's sophis-
tication, the location of the solicitation, the client's mental and
physical state and the opportunity or inducement to "shop around,"
into determining the prohibition's constitutionality. Not dispositive
are that in-person solicitation is the form of the solicitation, that the
motive for the solicitation is pecuniary gain, and that no harm ac-
tually resulted from the solicitation.
The decisions should exert a procompetitive influence if they are
properly interpreted by the bar. The Court appeared to recognize
"benign commercial solicitation" as a proper competitive practice
which benefits the public. The solicitation condemned achieves
none of the benefits which competition seeks to promote. For exam-
ple, one need only look at the result of the solicitation in Ohralik to
realize that some in-person solicitation leads to gross inefficiency. 49
C. The Court Strikes a Procompetitive Blow for International
Competition: Zenith
In a May 26, 1978 speech, Assistant Attorney General John H.
false, misleading or deceptive advertising and advertising dealing with illegal activities. In
addition, the state may promulgate reasonable time, place and manner restrictions and
require either supplemental information or warnings where necessary. 433 U.S. at 383-84.
This position is bolstered by the recent decision in Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568
S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978), where the court held that a law firm's mailing of its fee schedules to
various real estate agencies was protected. It said the solicitation was more similar to the
advertising in Bates than to in-person solicitation. Id. at 934.
348. Benign commercial solicitation was defined as:
solicitation by advice and information that is truthful and that is presented in a
noncoercive, nondeceitful and dignified manner to a potential client who is emotionally
and physically capable of making a rational decision either to accept or reject the
representation with respect to a legal claim or matter that is not frivolous.
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 98 S.Ct. at 1927 n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring in part). This
standard appears to negate, implicitly at least, the concerns expressed over in-person solicita-
tion.
349. One of the accident victims paid the soliciting attorney $4,166.E6 of a $12,500 insur-
ance settlement even though he did not represent her during settlement negotiations. She
paid the attorney who finally represented her an additional $900. The other victim ended up
paying the attorney over $2,000, even though she had fired him. Time and other resources
were wasted. 98 S.Ct. at 1916-17 nn.5&6.
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Shenefield of the Antitrust Division expressed concern over an in-
creasing trend toward protectionism in international trade and out-
lined several programs undertaken by the Division to promote com-
petition in international markets.35 ° Efforts toward increased com-
petition received a boost in Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 351
in which the Court held that the Secretary of the Treasury need not
collect countervailing duties on certain goods shipped to the United
States by Japan.
Section 303(a) of the Tariff Act of 193035 requires the Secretary
to levy a "countervailing duty" on goods exported into the United
States where the exporting country pays a "bounty or grant" upon
exported merchandise. The amount of the duty is the "net amount"
of the sum paid by the foreign country to its manufacturer. Zenith
alleged that Japanese tax laws conferred such a bounty by exempt-
ing from an indirect commodity tax certain electronics products
exported, while requiring the tax to be paid on the same products
when sold in Japan. In the case of exported goods, the tax was either
never paid or if paid, was remitted353 by Japan to the manufac-
turer .3 The Secretary argued, consistent with the position taken by
the Treasury Department since 1898, that since the remission was
"non-excessive," i.e., not in excess of the tax paid, no countervailing
duty was required.35
The Supreme Court upheld the Secretary's position, relying on
the statute's language, legislative history and the overall purpose of
the duty provision. It traced the history of the statute and its prede-
cessors from 1890, when the legislative history indicated that
"bounties" meant the amount by which remission exceeded taxes
paid; through the 1894 version of the statute, which expressly in-
350. Address by John H. Shenefield, ALI-ABA Course of Study on International Antitrust
(May 26, 1978), reprinted in 5 TRDE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,371.
351. 98 S.Ct. 2441 (1978).
352. 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (Supp. V, 1975), in pertinent part, provides as follows:
(1) Whenever any country. . . shall pay or bestow, directly or indirectly, any bounty
or grant upon the manufacture or production or export of any article. . . produced in
such cohntry. . . then upon the importation of such. . . merchandise into the United
States. . .there shall be levied and paid... a duty equal to the net amount of such
bounty or grant.
353. The term "remission" as used herein includes both situations, i.e., where the tax was
never paid and where it was paid and subsequently remitted.
354. 98 S.Ct. at 2441.
355. Id. at 2442.
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cluded that definition; to the 1897 version, still in force, which uses
the term net bounty, which could only mean the excess of amount
remitted over amount paid."'
Additionally, the legislative history showed that the statute's pur-
pose was to negate the unfair competitive advantage which some
nations gave their manufacturers by subsidizing exported goods.37
Where, however, the remission was non-excessive, the Treasury
Department posited that the foreign manufacturer gained no com-
petitive advantage because although no indirect tax was levied by
the exporting country, the goods were subject to excise, sales and
use taxes imposed by this country.38
The Court found Downs v. United States,35' relied on by Zenith,
to be unpersuasive. Downs involved Russian trade laws which pro-
vided for a nonexcessive remission but also granted the manufac-
turer the right to sell in Russia an amount equal to the amount of
the product exported without paying an excise tax. Thus the provi-
sion, as a whole, amounted to an excessive remission,3 0 and a coun-
tervailing duty was proper. Finally, the Court noted that the Secre-
tary's position had been incorporated in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, and thus there was substantial reliance placed
on the continiation of the Secretary's position by both private inter-
ests and foreign governments. 8'
Of course, the issue in Zenith is only one of many crucially impor-
tant problems involving international economic competition.
"Dumping," the selling by foreign countries of goods here at below
cost or below the price charged in the exporting country, is perhaps
the most well known. One source, however, has noted that "[tihe
Zenith case itself was generally viewed as an invitation to trade
chaos if the Court had upheld the U.S. manufacturer's position. '32
356. Id. at 2445-48.
357. Id. at 2448. The problem of export subsidies by foreign manufacturers continues to
cause serious international trade difficulties. See, e.g., Farm Issues Trip the Trade Talks,
Great Lakes Ruling Irks Steel, and A Code for Subsidies, Bus. WEEK, August 7, 1978, at 24,
25, 94.
358. 98 S.Ct. at 2451.
359. 187 U.S. 496 (1903).
360. 98 S.Ct. at.2451. The Secretary had reached the same conclusion, unlike the situation
in Zenith.
361. Id. at 2449.
362. Zenith Hasn't Settled All Vital Trade Issues, LEGAL TimES OFI WASMNGTON, June 26,
1978, at 4, col. 1.
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D. Deconcentrating the Communications Media: National Citizen
Committee for Broadcasting
Under the Communications Act of 1934,363 the Federal Communi-
cations Commission is directed to allocate the limited supply of
radio and television frequencies by licensing stations to operate." 4
In addition, the FCC must promulgate regulations to implement the
statutory scheme 6' "as public convenience, interest, or necessity
requires" ;36 these regulations espouse its views with-respect to poli-
cies which promote the public interest.
In its licensing and other regulatory functions, the FCC has
placed heaviest reliance on the two policy goals of, first, achieving
the best possible service for the public, and second, insuring through
diversification of ownership rules that a variety of programs and
viewpoints are broadcast and that economic concentration in the
broadcast industry is not excessive.367 While some media other than
television and radio, such as newspapers, are not under direct super-
vision by the FCC, its licensing decisions often take ownership of
such media into consideration. 8
In 1970, the FCC commenced a rulemaking proceeding to ascer-
tain to what extent the common ownership of broadcast services
311
and newspapers should be prohibited. Based upon evidence submit-
ted during the proceeding, it determined that while common owner-
ship had not been shown to be detrimental to the public interest,
either because commonly owned facilities espoused similar view-
363. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970).
364. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
365. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1970).
366. 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1970).
367. Several of the FCC's regulations in this regard merit mention. In 1941, networks were
prohibited from owning more than one station in the same community, and entities were
precluded from owning more than one network. This regulation was upheld in National
Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). Shortly thereafter, a rule prohib-
iting an entity from operating more than one "broadcast service," i.e., a radio or television
station, in the same community, was promulgated.
In 1953, a rule allowing one entity to own no more than a total of seven FM radio stations,
seven AM stations and five VHF television stations was enacted. Its validity was upheld in
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956). And finally, a 1970 regulation
prohibits prospectively the common ownership of a radio station and VHF television station
in the same market.
368. See, e.g., McClatchy Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 239 F.2d 15 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
369. Broadcast services as used herein means AM and FM radio and VHF television.
1978]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
points or because they were anticompetitive, it felt that restricting
common ownership might promote more diversity in programming
without causing any concomitant harms.3Y0 Accordingly, it promul-
gated a two part rule. The first part, based upon the first amend-
ment policy to achieve "the widest possible dissemination of infor-
mation from diverse and antagonistic sources," ' prospectively pro-
hibited the common ownership of a daily newspaper and a broad-
cast service serving the same area.2 The second portion, based
upon both first amendment and antitrust policies, required certain
already existing commonly owned broadcast service and daily news-
paper combinations to divest either the newspaper or broadcast
portion within five years.373 The FCC determined that divestiture of
all combinations would not further its policy of assuring the best
service possible because of the experience obtained and high quality
of service rendered in the past by many combinations.
Review of the rule was sought by several petitioners including the
National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, which argued that
the divestiture provisions did not go far enough; and the National
Association of Broadcasters and American Newspaper Publishers
Association, which felt that the rule was too restrictive and argued
that it violated the first amendment, exceeded the FCC's authority
and that the difference in treatment afforded combinations by the
divestiture provision was arbitrary and capricious. : '74 The Court of
Appeals upheld the prospective ownership provision but required
divestiture of all existing combinations.3 15
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the original rule.3 6 Be-
cause the authority of the FCC to promulgate common ownership
rules with respect to industries regulated by it had been upheld in
370. In re Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broad-
cast Stations, 50 F.C.C. 2d 1046, 1074-86 (1975).
371. Id. at 1048.
372. 47 C.F.R. § 73.35(a) (1977).
373. 47 C.F.R. § 73.35(c) (1977). Not all combinations were required to divest. Divestiture
was required only where the combination had "an effective monopoly in the marketplace of
ideas as well as economically." 50 F.C.C. 2d at 1081. The FCC deemed an effective monopoly
to mean a combination between a community's only newspaper and its only television station
or between the only newspaper and only radio station if there were no television station. Id.
at 1083-84. The regulation would force divestiture of some sixteen broadcast service stations.
374. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 98 S.Ct. 2096, 2109 (1978).
375. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 555 F.2d 938, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
376. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 98 S.Ct. 2096, 2104 (1978).
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the past,377 the broadcasters this time argued that the FCC had
exceeded its authority by attempting to regulate the newspaper
industry as well.3 18 The Court noted, however, that the FCC's man-
date to regulate in the public interest clearly allows it to consider
both first amendment and antitrust policies, both of which might
be promoted by following a pattern of mass-media ownership diver-
sification in granting broadcast service licenses.379 Thus, in deter-
mining whether to grant a license, it properly could consider
whether the applicant also owned another media." °
An argument that the rule violated the newspapers' and broad-
casters' first amendment rights fared no better. The Court noted
that because of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies and the result-
ing necessity for allocation, the" 'First Amendment right to broad-
cast [is not] comparable to the right of every individual to speak,
write, or publish.' "31 While the allocation must promote the public
interest, diversification aids in achieving that goal.3 2 Indeed, diver-
sification promotes rather than suppresses free speech.313
The final challenge was that the dichotomy in the divestiture
provision, i.e., that only those combinations constituting "effective
monopolies" were subject to divestiture, was arbitrary and capri-
cious under the Administrative Procedure Act.3 " The Court noted
that while the rule was not subject to the "substantial evidence"
review test, it must be "rational" and "based on consideration of the
relevant factors. ' 13 8
While the FCC realized that the continuing existence of combina-
377. See cases cited note 342 supra.
378. 98 S.Ct. at 2111.
379. Id. at 2112. With respect to the propriety of the FCC basing its decisions on antitrust
policies, the Court quoted from its earlier decision in United States v. Radio Corp. of America,
358 U.S. 334, 351-52 (1959):
[I]n a given case the commission might find that antitrust considerations alone
would keep the statutory standard from being met, as when the publisher of the sole
newspaper in an area applies for a license for the only available radio and television
facilities, which, if granted, would give him a monopoly of that area's major media of
mass communication.
380. Id. 98 S.Ct. at 2112.
381. 98 S.Ct. at 2114 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,388 (1969)).
382. 98 S.Ct. at 2114.
383. Id. at 2115.
384. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
385. 98 S.Ct. at 2116.
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tions would not serve its policy of assuring the greatest variety of
programming and viewpoints, it felt that divestiture would disserve
its policy of assuring the best possible service. 385 In the case of the
effective monopolies, however, the need for diversification was
"especially great." ' And although the standards for what consti-
tuted an effective monopoly were not based on precise evidence, the
line had to be drawn somewhere. Accordingly, neither the judgment
to bar future combinations while "grandfathering" some existing
commonly owned newspaper and broadcast services, nor the deci-
sion to require divestiture in less than all cases of common owner-
ship was irrational,311 and the original rule as promulgated by the
FCC was upheld.
The FCC's two governing policies 39 and the challenged rule ap-
pear to highlight the argument which often arises in antitrust eco-
nomics that trade-offs are sometimes necessary between industry
fragmentation and efficiency.39 Diversification of ownership at-
tempts to maximize or at least increase the number of competitors
in both the commercial market and marketplace of ideas. On the
other hand, the goal of providing the best possible service to the
public appears to be more concerned with efficiency. In
Broadcasters, the Court noted that the goals are "sometimes con-
flicting." 391
By barring commonly-owned newspapers and broadcast services
prospectively, the FCC emphasized the goal of increasing the num-
386. 50 F.C.C.2d at 1074-86. The Supreme Court noted that
[tihe [FCC's] Order identifies several specific respects in which the public interest
would or might be harmed if a sweeping divestiture requirement were imposed: the
stability and continuity of meritorious service provided by the newspaper owners as a
group would be lost; owners who had provided meritorious service would unfairly be
denied the opportunity to continue in operation; "economic dislocations" might pre-
vent new owners from obtaining sufficient working capital to maintain the quality of
local programming; and local ownership of broadcast stations would probably de-
crease. [Citation omitted.] We cannot say that the Commission acted irrationally in
concluding that these public interest harms outweighed the potential gains that would
follow from increasing diversification of ownership.
98 S.Ct. at 2117 (footnotes omitted).
387. Id. at 2122.
388. Id. at 2119.
389. See text accompanying note 342 supra.
390. See generally R. BORK, THE ANITRusT PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 4-11
(1978).
391. 98 S.Ct. at 2105.
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ber of competitors. It realized, however, that this should be pushed
only so far and that in the case of many existing combinations,
substantial efficiencies of integration benefiting the public were re-
alized. Thus, total divestiture was not required. Notwithstanding
efficiencies, there then came a point where the potential for exercise
of monopoly power was too great to allow. In these few cases, divesti-
ture was required. Although the theory is interesting, it is impossi-
ble to second-guess the correctness of the points at which the FCC
drew its lines without closely examining all evidence presented. The
Court, relying on the FCC's expertise and the limited scope of re-
view, refused to do this.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In retrospect, last Term was highly interesting but far from shock-
ing. Rather, the Court took the opportunity to reemphasize and
reinforce some of the trends established in previous Terms.
In most areas, the Burger Court has evidenced a policy of restraint
and moderation by limiting its holdings to the narrow facts pre-
sented. Issues not vital to the specific question presented were
usually avoided. While Lafayette and Barry are examples of this
policy, Gypsum and Engineers evidence that the Court will venture
outside the strict parameter of the specific question when such will
clarify a fundamental antitrust tenet. In Engineers, for example, the
Court went far beyond the necessary decision to correct what it
considered a widely held perversion in rule of reason interpretation.
The Court's exercise afield in Gypsum is not aseasy to explain, but
perhaps it reflects a desire to emphasize the new seriousness at-
tached to criminal violations and the concomitant burden on the
government to prove a violation.
Also continued last Term was the Court's strict reading of statu-
tory language, while echoing the ever-popular refrain of "if you
don't like the law, ask Congress, not us, to change it." This policy
was followed even where a harsh result was necessitated, as in
Greyhound, although the Court explained how to circumvent its
decision. Exemptions continue to be strictly scrutinized and seldom
implied. In substantive matters, the Court continues to emphasize
economic analysis and competitive effect.
Although containing no bombshells, the 1977 Term's decisions
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will have significant effects. In the criminal area, with the addition
of an element of intent, there should be less reluctance on the part
of federal judges to mete out stiff penalties and longer sentences to
those convicted. On the civil side, per se cases will no longer be
defended on policy and other non-economic grounds.
Litigation, unfortunately, is necessary to answer many of the
questions left open in last Term's decisions. Is a fully integrated
agri-business a "farmer"? Are state sanctioned boycotts by insur-
ance companies immune from attack? What exactly is needed to
show "contemplation" by the state legislature sufficient to sustain
the government action exemption? Just as Ohralik and Primus were
necessary to test the limits of Bates, the scope of several decisions
this Term needs delineation.
In general, then, the theme of the Supreme Court's 1977 Term in
its antitrust cases seems to be one of polishing the already estab-
lished law by solving particular problems. Above all, the Court con-
tinues to espouse a philosophy which recognizes the extreme import-
ance of economic competition and promotion thereof by the anti-
trust laws. Moreover, one cannot read the non-antitrust cases with-
out feeling that this procompetitive philosophy has spilled over into
other areas of the law.
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